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Once  decisions  are made  - to concentrate  industry,  to rely on
private vehicles for transportation,  to  subsidize  a particular
energy  source,  or to use a certain  environmental  policy  - they
acquire  a certain  permanence.  For this reason,  it is important  to
design policy with an eye toward longer-run  concerns.  In ad-
dressing  urban  air  pollution  cost-effectively,  it is also important
not to wait until the problem assumes crisis proportions.  By
closing options, delays in implementing  corrective  measures
will raise  the eventual  cost of environmental  protection.
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Levinson and Shetty review the cconomic  may outweigh the cost of monitoring and enforc-
principles that should guide the efficient choice  ing a single direct policy. Finally, indirect
of targeted policies for environmental protection.  regulations may be accompanied by perverse
They recommend policy instruments along three  incentives, such as new source bias or reduced
dimensions: (1) whether they use economic  marginal costs of polluting.  Efforts to offset
incentives, (2) whether they target environmental  these perverse incentives by regulating addi-
damage directly, and (3) whether they specify  tional variables may be subject to second-best
prices, quantities, or technologies. This distinc-  problems: two regulations with opposite results
tion is helpful in guiding policy choices because  can be costlier than no regulation at all.
many discussions in the economics literature on
environmental policies mistakenly claim advan-  The main lesson Lcvinson and Shetty draw
tages for incentive-based instruments by show-  from the cases examined: Once decisions are
ing, for instance, that direct policies of this sort  made - whether to concentrate industry, to rely
are less costly than indirect non-incentive  on private vchicles for transportation, to subsi-
measures.  dize a particular energy source, or to use a
certain environmental policy - they acquire a
After analyzing efficient responses to the air  certain permanence. Capital is invested and
pollution problem, Levinson and Shetty come up  workers are trained under the prevailing laws,
with somewhat surprising results. For three of  and these are costly to change. Los Angeles
the cities (Ankara, Los Angeles, and Mexico  cannot reverse its emphasis on the automobile;
City), the efficient instruments selected by this  Brazil cannot easily move its industrial center
(admittedly limited) exercise are similar: indirect  away from Cubatao; Mexico cannot quicky
incentive-based policies. Only Cubatao differs in  reduce the concentration in its capital city; and
that direct non-incentive regulations are the  Turkey's  development would suffer if energy
efficient policy choice.  subsidies were removed abruptly.
But choosing indirect policy instruments is  For this reason, it is important to design
not without its problems. This category is the  policy with an eye toward longer-run concerns. It
broadest one. For instnace, while there is only a  makes sense, for example, for cities such as
single direct incentive-based price instrument  Ankara to begin to enact policies to prevent
(emissions taxes), several indirect incentive-  mobile source air pollution from worsening over
based price policies exist including taxes on  the next decades.
inputs and on complementary and substitute
products. Indirect policies also cannot simulta-  Levinson and Shetty also point out the
neously target the incentives to reduce waste  dangers of ignoring intermedia substitution of
generation, increase production efficiency, and  pollutants. In places such as Cubatao, where air
reduce output to reduce pollution. A combination  quality has been cleaned up, the improvement
of indirect policies will then be required to  may have come at the expense of water quality
control pollution. But if the regulatory costs of  or the accumulation of hazardous wastes.
controlling additional variables are high they
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This paper asks the question: what choice  of environmental  policies is efficient, and how does
that choice vary by pollutant, resource, country, or source?
"Environmental  problems" refer to pollution and natural resour.J depletion  caused directly or
indirectly by human activity.  These problems involve air and water pollution, solid waste, and the
overuse of renewable  and exhaustible  resources. To correct environmental  problems,  governments  have
a wide choice of policy instruments. A considerable  literature  has been devoted to analyzing  different
types of instruments. Three common  distinctions  between instruments  are: (1) whether the instrument
relies on economic  incentives  by somehow  pricing incremental  units of pollution  or resource depletion;
(2) whether  the instrument  targets the environmental  damage  directly, or indirectly  via some proxy; and
(3) whether the instrument  regulates prices, quantities,  or technologies.
The goal of the first part of this paper is to review the economic  principles on which policy
choices  should be based, and to consider  how they might be applied in the real world. The second part
of the paper examines  four cities that continue  to face serious air pollution  problems. The cities chosen
differ in ways that illustrate  the economic  principles  that should guide efficient  policy choice.
11. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Environmental problems
Environmental  regulators face two broad classes of environmental  problems.  The first is the
misuse of natural resources.  Naturally-occurring  products  of the environment  that cannot themselves  be
manufactured,  natural resources are inputs to the production process.  Market equilibria with natural
resources generally involve above-optimal  or sooner-than-optimal  use of the resource.  In theory, if
property rights could be assigned definitively  and traded costlessly, overuse would not be a problem.'
Usually neither is possible, and the subsequent  lack of property rights results in open access to some
resources and a consequent  lack of consideration  for future generations.
Whether renewable or exhaustible,  natural resources are susceptible  to overdevelopment. For
renewable resources, optimal development  would maintain some sustainable rate.  For  exhaustible
resources with constant  extraction  costs, extraction  should  occur such that the price of the resource  rises
at the social discount rate. 2 For many reasons, real resource prices do not follow this pattern.  Given
imperfect  capital markets, administered  prices, non-infinite  horizons, soft budget constraints,  or capital
market interest rates that differ from the social discount  rate, the market allocation  will not be optimal. 3
Pollutants comprise the second class of environmental  problems.  Pollutants are undesirable
byproducts  of production  and consumption  activities  that are released  into the environment. When  their
adverse impacts are borne by other producers and consumers  and not communicated  through markets,
these byproducts  are economic  externalities. A certain amount of such pollution is inevitable. Smoke,
'This is the well-known  result of Coase (1960).
2The  theory  of optimal resource extraction  was first developed in Hotelling  (1931).
3Baumol  and Oates (1988), pp. 138-51.
1sewage, and trash provide classic examples.  The disposal services of the environmental  media (air,
wate., and soil) into which these physical outputs are discharged  can be considered  economic  inputs.
Because  property rights to these media are costly or impossible  to define, pollution sources do not face
the external costs of disposing  of wastes and thus produce  too much of the pollutant.
There are three useful characterizations  of both pollutants  and natural resources. Pollutants  can
be categorized by absorptive capacity (stock or fund), area (local or regional), and vertical damage
causation (surface or global). 4 Stock pollutants like heavy metals and CFCs cannot be absorbed by
environmental  media, and so the damage from them is related to their total accumulation. Regional  or
global pollutants such as CO 2 and CFCs tend to be uniformly  mixed with damage being independent  of
where emissions  actually  occur. Local or surface  pollutants  such as particulates  and NO, tend to be non-
unifurmly  mixed, and have strong ambient  effects. Natural  resources  can also be characterized  this way:
resources can be  exhaustible or  renewable; local or  regional; or  they can have surface or  global
implications  (Table 1). These  characteristics  of environmental  problems  will have important  implications
for designing  policy.
Table  I
A Common Taxonomy of Pollutants and Natuml Resources
|___ _  Pollutant  Natural  Resource
Absorotive capacity
stock/exhaustible  * nuclear waste  0 mineral  deposits
fund/renewable  * NO.  0  fisheries
local  * noise  0 soils
regional  0  acid rain  0  ground water
Vertical damace
surface  0  smog  0  park land
global  * CFCs, carbon  * biodiversity
There are many relationships between pollutants and resources.  Some pollutants (SO2)  can
destroy resources (forests), and  extraction and  use  of  some resources (oil) generate pollution.
Environmental  problems  also interact  as complements  or substitutes  in production. Some subŽ.itutes  for
ozone-depleting  chlorofluorocarbons  may have high global warming  potential. Some pollutants can be
disposed  of in a choice  of media (air, water, land). These  relationships  complicate  matters for regulators,
who must avoid merely shifting  environmental  problems  between  media.
An important  difference  between  stock pollutants  and exhaustible  resources should  be noted. As
a resource  becomes  scarce, its price rises so triat  less is demanded. Eventually,  it should become  scarce
enough that substitutes  become economically  viable, and the remaining  stock is preserved (Hotelling's
rule). For stock pollutants,  there is no such ameliorating  mechanism. Disposal  remains  free to polluters
and costly  to society  no matter how much of the pollutant  accumulates.
4Tietenberg  (1988), p. 307.
2Solid wastes form a special category of pollutants.  Like other pollutants, solid wastes impose
negative  externalities. However, because  they can be easily and covertly disposed  of, they pose special
problems  for policy makers. Covert disposal,  or "midnight  dumping,"  harms the environment  more than
proper disposal. Thus the conventional  externality  solution-charging  the polluter the marginal  external
damage cost from improper  disposal--may  not be efficient  if illegal  disposal cannot  be discouraged  easily.
The common thread running through all of these environmental  problems is inefficient market
allocation. Because  the market fails, there may be a role for government  intervention. The decision to
intervene depends on the costs and benefits of doing so, which in turn depend on the method of
intervention  chosen. Faced  with environmental  problems,  governments  must  decide in each case  not only
whether to intervene, but what measures to use.  A discussion  of the policy instruments  available to
regulators  follows.
Policy instruments
In many countries, macroeconomic  and sectoral policies encourage environmental  degradation.
Resource use subsidies, unaccountable  public ownership and management  of natural resources, trade
restrictions, and other public policies can place stresses on environmental  resources.  Reform of such
policies is often called a  "no-regrets"  approach because it may improve welfare even without taking
account of environmental  benefits. By eliminating  policies  that distort market incentives  and themselves
cause a  deadweight loss,  "no-regrets" reforms can costlessly reduce environmental degradation.
However, even  if these  reforms were to be enacted-which is not always  easy since they enjoy  the support
of strong interest  groups-they would not be sufficient. As long as property  rights to many  environmental
resources remain prohibitively  costly to enforce, additional  government intervention  may be necessary
to address the resulting externalities.
Direct public management of-and  investment  in providing-some environmental  services is
thought  to be necessary  because  they are public  goods. Ex-post  clean  up of pollution  by sewage  treatment
plants, for example, is one case where collective  treatment  facilities, although efficient, are unlikely to
be provided by the private sector.  Governments  also incur research and development  expenditures  for
pollution control technologies  and substitutes  for natural resources.
Reliance on liability works best in a world with low information  and transactions costs, and
clearly  defined  property  rights.  For most pollutants,  the adverse  effects  are too dispersed  and too delayed
for blame to  be accurately placed.'  The United States' Comprehensive Environmental  Response,
Compensation,  and Liability Act (CERCLA  or "Superfund"),  which legislates  strict, joint, and several
liability for cleanup costs of unsafe  hazardous  waste sites, is a case in point. It is the only legislation  of
its type in the world, and in practice  has been costly, litigious, and ineffective  in cleaning  up toxic waste
sites.'
When public investmenlt  or management is too costly and reliance on liability is infeasible,
governments  should intervene  to protect the environment  by attempting  to change  the behavior  of public
and private users of environmental  resources. The design of these targeted interventions  is the focus of
this paper.
5See Mennell (1991).
6See  Hahn (1991).
3Table 2 shows three ways of categ¶orizing  choices of intervention: by the use of economic
incentives  (use or non-use);  by the level of cc  ntrol (direct or indirect);  and by the control  variable  (price,
quantity, or technology). These three policy'  choices generate  twelve possible modes of intervention.
Two of the cells in Table 2, corresponding  tc direct and indirect  non-incentive  price interventions,  are
empty because price interventions  are by defiaition incentive-based. While the ten other cells in Table
2 contain theoretically  valid policies, some have no real-world counterparts. The choice among  these
policies  can be made  on grounds  of economic  efficiency;  this paper will analyze  such choices  with regard
to air pollution in four cities.
Table  2
bternative  Policies  to Reduco  PoHution
. . . . . ~~~~Prieo  Quantity  Technologyl
Incentive  Direct  emissions  tax  tmdeable  emission  technology  tax on
.___.___._  pennits  presumed emissions
Indirect  fuel tax  tradeable production  subsidize R&D & fuiel
.______________  ._____._____._  permits  efficieney
Non-incentive  Direct  emissions  stds  technical  stds
Indirect  . product  stds, bans,  efficiency  stds
quota
Use of economic incentives
Economists  usually focus on a narrower categorization  of policy instruments  than is shown in
Table 2-the choice  between  traditional  "command  and control"  regulations  and more innovative  "market-
based" instruments. 7 Measures  that confront  polluters  with a price for each additional  unit of pollution
can be described  as incentive-based. Economists  favor these  approaches  because  they clearly internalize
the external costs of pollution.  Non-incentive  instruments  do not price incremental  pollution in this
manner. Instead,  they require polluters  to emit only certain  concentrations  or levels  of effluent, ban some
processes and mandate others, impose standards for energy conservation, or allocate resources for
preservation, all without reference, or only vague reference, to the costs involved.
One variant of the incentive-based  price instrument  is the deposit-refund  scheme.  When it is
difficult for authorities  to prove violations  of the law but simple for individuals  to prove compliance,
deposit-refund  schemes  shift the burden  of proof from the regulator  to the polluter. In the drink container
industry, refunds for empty aluminum  ccntainers  alleviate  both a pollution  problem (litter) and possibly
a natural resource problem (aluminum).  Similarly governments  could require deposits in return for
permits to use natural resources or construct  hazardous  waste dumps, and refund these only when the
resource extraction  or dumping  has been completed  in an acceptable  manner.
User fees, whose purpose is to raise revenues from polluters  for publicly-funded  enviromental
projects, are often confused  with incentive-based  policies. Two characteristics  distinguish  user fees from
'The  notable exception is  Eskeland and Jimenez (1991), which distinguishes between policy
instruments  in terms of the use of economic  incentives  as well as the level of control; p.3.
4true effluent  ct.arges. First, most user fees dc,  not vi  fi--  emissions,  and thus do not give individual
polluters  the incentive  to reduce emissions. Sec  . 't  *'  's  are rarely at levels higher  than marginal
abatement  costs for producers, and thus induce  no  ,.,nal  reduction in the quantity of pollution.
Incentive-based  quantity  instruments  ars tradeabie  permits  to pollute or to use a natural resource.
An attractive  feature of tradeable  quantity  permits is that they allow  groups outside  of the profit-making
industry  to participate  in pollution  reduction. Environmental  activists  could  purchase  pollution  rights and
store them.  However, due to  the public good aspect of these rights, it appears that even if  all
environmental activists in the U.S.  pooled their resources, they would not affect overall pollution
significantly. 8
The use of incentive-based  price instruments  is growing.  Some OECD countries tax leaded
gasoline  at higher  rates than unleaded. Sweden  taxes  the sale of cars without  catalytic  converters  and uses
the revenue to subsidize cars with them.'  Incentive-based  quantity schemes  have been used almost
exclusively  in the U.S.  Emissions  trading programs  have  been part of the Clean Air Act since 1975, and
an inter-refinery  trading program was  used in phasing  out leaded  gasoline  betweer.  1982  and 1986. The
amendments  to the Clean Air Act in 1990 contained  provisions  for electric companies  to buy and sell
permits to emit SO 2, and the Chicago  Board of Trade has even announced  plans to begin trading futures
contracts  based on these permits by 1993.1'
TMe literature that compares "market-based" and  "command and control" policis,  a'lnost
universally favors the former.  Yet, environmental  regulators rely on the latter throughout  the world.
While this disparity may partly reflect regulatory  error, the hypothesis  here is that it is also based on an
over-simplification  of regulatory decisionmaking. Even on efficiency  grounds alone, regulators must
compare policy options on the basis of attributes  in addition to whether economic  incentives  are used.
From a regulatory perspective,  the level of control or the control variable  (discussed  below) rather than
the use of economic incentives  may in many circumstances  be the most important choice variable.
Conclusions  about  the efficiency  properties  of incentive-  and non-incentive  based policies may be biased
unless these comparisons  also control for differences  in level of control or control variable.
Level of control
The only pure direct control variable is environmental  damage.  But damages are usually
impossible  to measure accurately.  Thus, policies that target emissions are typically considered  to be
direct.  This distinction  would be inconsequential  if pollutants  were all uniformly dispersed, with all
sources affecting  ambient quality equally regardless  of location. Alternative  indirect variables include
variable inputs to or outputs of production, fixed inputs to production, and substitutes  or complements
to any of the above. Given  the number  of these alternatives,  a variety of indirect  regulations  is possible.
Indirect  policies can target any of three parts of the pollution  process: waste generation  itself, the
efficiency  with which-  inputs are converted into outputs, and demand for the pollution-intensive  product
(see Figure 1).
'Bohm and Russell (1985), p. 421.
9Bernstein  (1991), p. 49.
"0Financial  Times, 7-24-91.
5EWi-iiij Direct  and indirect  policies  to reduce  sulfur  dioxide  fr-om  electric  power  generation
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Emissions  can  be expressed  as:
EMISSIONS  =  (EMISSIONS/INpuT)  *  (INPuT/ouTPur)  * (ouTPur).
For example,  for automobile  emissions  this  expression  corresponds  to:
EMISSIONS  =(EMISSIONS/GALLON  FUEL)  *  (GALLONS/MILE)  *  (MILES  DRIVN).
Requiring  cataytic  converters  reduces  emissions  per gallon  of fuel  bumned.  The corporate  average  fuel
economy  (CAFE)  regulation  in tixe  U.S. is an example  of the second  type  of policy,  one which  reduces
inputs  per unit output. Finally,  fuiel  taxes,  public  transport  subsidies  or parking  taxes  would  reduce  the
total vehicle  miles  travelled  in passenger  vehicles  by shifting  demand  to other  transport  modes.
Direct  instruments  are cost-effective  because  they equate  marginal  abatement  costs across  all
methods  of pollution  abatement. Indirect  instruments  omit some  of the possible  methods. Catalytic
converters  reduce  emissions  per gallon  but do not directy affect  energy  efficiency  (gallons/mile)  or
demand  (total  miles). Nor do indirect  instruments  necessarily  equate  marginal  abatement  costs  within
even  one of the three parts of the process. A tax on the sulfur  or carbon  content  of coal targets  the
emissions  per unit input  by inducing  electric  utilities  to switch  to cleaner  fuels. It might  also indirecty
decrease  electricity  demand  and increase  the efficiency  of the  generating  process. However,  a sulfur  tax
would  provide  no incentives  to develop  or install-abatement  technology  such  as flue gas desulfurizers
(scrubbers). An emissions-based  instrument,  on the other  hand, would  provide  incentives  to reduce
emissions  by all possible  methods.
Indirect  policies,  if designed  poorly,  may  also  provide  perverse  incentives.  For instance,  while
the CAFE  regulations  in the United  States  have  improved  the fuel  efficiency  of the 'process" 3 of driving,
more  fuel-efficient  vehicles  have  also  tended  to increase  miles  driven  by decreasing  the marginal  cost  of
6driving. The average fuel efficiency  of passenger  vehicles in the U.S. rose by about  22% between 1980
and 1988, which by itself should have contributed  to reduced emissions.  However, aided by falling
gasoline prices, greater fuel efficiency  meant that in real terms the fuel cost per mile fell by over 60%
during this period, and contributed  in part to the 16% increase  in passenger miles driven per capita. As
a result, air quality in many American cities has not improved  significantly  in recent years.
Indirect instruments  that target processes often do so based on the technology involved. In a
sense, all such technology  instruments  could  be described  as indirect,  since they can never provide  a full
set of incentives  to reduce pollution.  Nevertheless,  technology instruments  that operate directly on
emissions are classified here as "direct" in order to contrast them with technology  instruments  which
focus on altetnatives  to emissions,  such as process  or fuel efficiency. Hence, technology  is viewed  here
as a control variable dong with price and quantity.
Control variables
Regulators  must choose either prices, quantities,  or tecnoalogy  as a basis for regulation. It is
often difficult to discern the true control variable.  For example, in the U.S. the EPA sets effluent
standards  for water pollution  based on the assumed  use of specific control  technologies. While firms are
free to use any technology to achieve the standards, they know the technology  used by EPA.  They
minimize  their research  expenditure  and their legal risk by implementing  only the EPA's test technology.
Thus while  the EPA standard  is nominally  based on quantity, it is effectively  based on technology."'
Although the above discussion has focused on pollution reduction, policies aimed at natural
resource problems can also be characterized  usefuliy  by this three-way classification. Regulators  can
target the price or quantity of the resource, or the extraction technology.  They can use economic
incentives,  and can control resource use and extraction  directly or indirectly.
Evaluating policy instruments
Clearly, policymakers  use many criteria in choosing between alternative  policies to address
environmental  problems. However,  this paper is concerned  with examining  how  the efficiency  properties
of different policies depend on the characteristics  of the environmental  problem, rather than with
explaining  actual policy choices. Therefore, different policies are compared  according  to two criteria-
cost-effectiveness  and administrative  cost.  Other criteria such as the distributional  impacts and revenue
potential  are importanit  to the political  feasibility  of alternative  policies  but less relevant  to their economic
efficiency.' 2
Cost-effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness  is  necessary but  not  sufficient for  economic efficiency in  addressing
environmental  problems. For a set of environmental  policies  to be efficient,  they must yield  the socially
"OECD (1987) as cited in Bernstein  (1991), p. 8; Tietenberg  (1988), p. 416.
1' 2See Baumol  and Oates (1988) for a discussion  of.these issues, and Buchanan  and Tullock (1975)
and Hahn (1989) for analyses of the political economy of environmental  policy choice in the U.S.
Although  intermedia substitution  effects are relevant to economic  efficiency, these are not analyzed  in
detail  here since air pollution is the only concern  of this paper.
7optimal quantity of pollution or natural resource depletion, a well defined but abstract goal.  Cost-
effectiveness,  on the other hand, merely requires that these policies achieve a given improvement  in
environmental  quality at least cost.
To be cost-effective,  a pollution  abatement  policy must equalize  marginal  abatement  costs across
polluters. Otherwise,  an equivalent  amount  of pollution  reduction  could  be achieved  by allowing  the high
abatement cost polluter to produce one more unit of pollution, and requiring the low abatement  cost
polluter to abate by one more unit.  The difference  between  their marginal  abatement  costs would  be the
cost savings  generated  by such a policy change.
Only direct incentive-based  policy instruments  are necessarily  cost-effective. Price instruments
set the marginal abatement cost through the effluent tax.  Each polluter should respond by reducing
pollution  until its marginal  abatement  cost equals  this tax. Incentive-based  price instruments  include  taxes
and subsidies, and both types of measures  provide  the same signals to polluters or resource users in the
short run.  However, taxes or charges are superior in terms of dynamic cost-effectiveness. Subsidies
provide perverse incentives  to consumers  by reducing  the price of pollution-intensive  goods, and unless
entry is restricted, would eventually  lead to more firms producing  the same or greater total pollution  at
inefficiently  small scales. 13
Incentive-based  quantity instruments  such as tradeable permits are cost-effective  because the
market for permits sets the marginal abatement  cost for a target pollution level.  In a perfect permit
market, each  polluter's marginal  abatement  cost curve  will be its demand  curve  for pollution  permits, and
the market price of those permits will be equal to each polluter's equilibrium  marginal  abatement  cost."'
The cost-effectiveness  of tradeable quantity schemes  depends on the size and competitiveness  of the
market for permits. The larger the number  of polluting  or resource-using  firms, however, the higher  the
monitoring  and administrative  costs of the program.  Whether there exists a market size small enough
to have low administrative  costs, yet large enough for efficient  trading to occur, remains  unanswered  in
practice because  few incentive-based  quantity instnrments  have been implemented.
Well-designed  non-incentive  policies  may  approximate  cost-effectiveness.  Some  have argued  that
non-incentive  rules negotiated by skilled regulators at the plant level can allow enough flexibility  for
marginal abatement  costs to be equated across sources. In the U.K. and Japan, for instance, pollution
abatement decisions are based on confidential  negotiations  between regulators and individual  plants."'
It seems unlikely that such collaboration  would work in the United States, with its suspicious  attitudes
towards 'captured" regulators, or in countries  that lack adequate  safeguards  against corruption.
In  the  long  run,  however,  non-incentive policies are even less  likely  to  maintain any
approximation  of cost-effectiveness.  To be dynamically  cost-effective,  policies  must respond  well  to three
types of changes in the economy: demand changes, inflation, and technological  change."' In the first
two cases, changes in the economy alter the incentive  structure generated by the regulation.  With
technological  change, pollution control  regulations  themselves  can have important  effects on its pace and
'3Baumol  and Oates (;988), chapter 14; Eskbland  and Jimenez  (1991), pp. 16-17;  Pearce and Turner
(1990), p. 108.
1 4Pearce  and Turner (1990), p.  110.
'5CBO  (1985); Kopp, Portney, and DeWitt (1990), p. 22; Wheeler  (1991), pp. 734.
'6Tietenberg  (1988), p. 327.
8direction.
In the face of increasing  demand  for pollution-intensive  goods, no policy  can be entirely  flexible.
Even incentive-based  policies  have some rigidities. Quantity  instruments  maintain  the level of pollution,
while -atement costs and hence consumer  prices rise.  Price instruments  keep  abatement  costs constant
but all(,4' more pollution.  The advantage  of incentive-based  policies is that despite  such changes  they
maintain static cost-effectiveness.  Even well-designed non-incentive policies can lose their cost-
effectiveness  quickly in the face of such demand changes.
Inflation  erodes the real value of any price-based  policies. Most  textbook  treatments  thus assume
that over time, price instruments  will result in more pollution. In many cases, however, pollution  taxes
have  risen faster than inflation  over time, perhaps  because  governments  phase in taxes  gradually in order
to ease the shock to the economy  and the political  system." 7 Either way, nominal  price-based  policies
will not be dynamically  cost-effective  in an inflationary  world.
The third measure of  dynamic cost-effectiveness  is the policy's response to  and effect on
technological  change. Dynamically  efficient  instruments  encourage  the development  of new  technologies
for pollution reduction and abatement. Inefficient  instruments  stifle innovation. Incentive-based  price
and quantity instruments provide incentives  for firms to innovate in order to  reduce their costs of
pollution.  Non-incentive  emissions standards could conceivably  cause firms to conceal technological
advances  in order to deter regulators  from tightening  their standards," 8 and technological  standards lock
in the status quo.
Administrative costs
Cost-effectiveness  refers to the abatement costs borne by polluters.  Of equal importance in
economic  terms are the costs that regulators face in administering  envirommental  policies. Under this
category fall many related costs, of which monitoring and anforcement expenditures are the most
important. These costs should not differ significantly  between  incentive  and non-incentive  instruments.
To administer  either instrument,  regulators  must identify  polluters,  measure  their baseline and continuing
levels of emissions, monitor ambient  pollution, and punish violations  of the law.19
Analogously,  it might be true that the administrative  costs do not differ much  by control  variable.
For price and quantity standards, regulators must have detailed information  about emissions and their
relationship  to ambient quality.'  To successfully  implement  a technology standard, regulators must
have  equally  complex  information  about  available  technologies  for pollution  control  and their relationships
to ambient  quality.  Depending  on the number  of polluters, the complexity  of abatement  technologies,
and the ease of evading each type of regulation,  emissions monitoring  or technology  monitoring  could
be more costly.
"7Hahn  (1989), "Economic  prescriptions,"  p. 107.
'9Tietenberg  (1988), p. 318.
l9Bernstein  (1991), p. 27; and Wheeler  (1991), p. 22.
'Administrative costs might be lower for incentive-based  price policies compared  to those based on
quantities  because regulators  are more familiar  with the using taxes rather than tradeable  permits. From
the U.S. experience, which has emphasized  quantity-based  rather than price-based  instruments  in using
economic  incentives,  this difference appears  not to be substantial.
9While administrative  costs may not vary significantly  with the use of incentives  or the control
variable, they would be expected  to differ considerably  between  direct and indirect controls. Because
direct policies are tied closely to environmental  damage, they focus on actions specific to individual
sources of pollution or resource use.  For these policies to be effective-whether or not they rely on
economic  incentives,  the regulatory  authority  must monitor  the behavior  of individual  sources  and enforce
their  compliance.  Indirect policies, by  contrast, have less onerous monitoring and  enforcement
requirements  because, as with input and output taxes, they apply at a more aggregated  level than the
emissions  or resource use of individual  sources. In comparing  direct and indirect  policies, an important
consideration,  therefore, would be the difference  in administrative  costs.
The parameters of efricient policy choice
The efficient policy combination for the purposes of this paper is defined as that mix of
instruments  that is cost-effective  in static and dynamic  terms, including  the costs of administering  the
policies. The focus below is on characterizing  real-world  parameters  that can be used to determine  each
of three characteristics  of the efficient policy mix: the level of control; the use of incentives;  and the
control variable. The decisions  about these three attributes  themselves  are not separable and cannot be
analyzed  as the sum of three independent  discrete choices. In general, the outcome  depends  on the order
in which the three choices are made.  For example, if technology  instruments  are preferred to price or
quantity  instruments,  this generally  also has implications  for whether  economic  incentives  should  be used.
Nevertheless,  it is useful to regard  the choices  separately  both for analytic  clarity and because  in practice
parameter values  and trade-offs  are never so clear that the ordering  of choices  matters significantly.
Reliance on economic incentives
The deadweight  loss associated  with using non-incentive  rather than incentive  policies increases
with the variance  of abatement  costs  among  polluters. If all polluters  have  identical  abatement  costs, then
even a regulation  that mandates  a percentage  reduction in emissions  would  be cost-effective. The more
the marginal  abatement cost curves differ, the higher the gains from switching  to an incentive-based
policy. The range of production  technologies,  perhaps  as measured  by the variance  in the age of installed
capital or in the capital-labor  ratio, might serve as a proxy for variance  in abatement  costs.
Due to their physical location, the emissions of some polluters cause more damage.  These
ambient  effects influence  the cost-effectiveness  of incentive-based  policies. Their net impact  depends  on
how closely  they are correlated  to abatement  costs. With incentive  instruments,  high marginal  abatement
cost polluters will abate less.  If emissions  from high abatement  cost polluters  also cause  more damages,
this would be an undesirable result.  If, on the other hand, high abatement  cost polluters have lower
ambient  effects, an incentive-based  policy would  be even more cost-effective. 21
The stringency  of the regulation  also affects the cost-effectiveness  of incentive-based  policies.
Tietenberg  (1988)  describes  a nonlinear  negative  relationship  between  control stringency  and cost savings
from incentive-based  policies. For moderate  ambient  standards,  higher  standards  favor incentive  policies
more. For stringent  standards, however, higher  standards  reduce  the relative  cost advantage  of incentive
policies.22  There are (at least) three possible explanations  for this negative  relationship  (see Figure 2).
21See Miltz et.al. (1988)
22Tietenberg  (1988), p. 345.
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.. The interfirm  variation  in abatement  costs may depend  on the control stringency. In this case the result
is straightforward.  Stringent uniform standards move all firms onto the portion of their marginal
abatement cost curves that is less variable across firms.  Second, no polluter can abate beyond 100
percent.  If regulations  are stringent enough so that some firms cannot abate more without going out of
business, then cost savings  will be constrained. The third reason for this negative correlation  between
cost savings and stringency  has to do with the way this difference  is measured  (rietenberg 1988)-as the
ratio of costs of non-incentive  to incentive  policies (always 2  1).  Even if absolute cost savings are
independent  of stringency, they will shrink relative to total compliance  costs, which obviously rise as
stringency  increases.
The cost-effectiveness  of incentive-based  policy  depends  on the assumption  that  polluters  minimize
costs.  For this reason, incentive-based  regulations  will probably  not be optimal  to control pollution by
public enterprises  or regulated  industries,  where cost minimization  may not be an appropriate  behavioral
assumption. Finally, higher economic  growth and inflation  will imply a greater need for regulations  to
be dynamically  efficient.  In more rapidly changing economies,  the flexibility  of incentive  policies in
adapting  to these changes  makes them more attractive.
Of course, environmental  regulatory  systems  need  not fall neatly into the incentive/non-incentive
classification. Many systems are mixed, utilizing  elements  of each type of regulation.'  Baumol and
Oates (1988) make a strong case for supplementing  incentive-based  systems with non-incentive  policies
in circumstances where the environmental  regulations must change rapidly in response to  random
events.3' In the face of unexpected  weather changes,  for example,  they argue that standards are easier
to change than taxes, with more predictable quantitative  results.
Direct and indirect policies
As discussed  above, there are three means  of reducing  pollution:  reducing waste generation  per
unit of input; increasing output per unit of input; and reducing  output demand.  Only direct price or
quantity instruments  equate marginal  abatement costs across and within all three.  Requiring  abatement
technologies,  although  considered  a direct instrument,  only gets at the first and third.  Upstream  (input)
instruments  only induce input substitution  and perhaps a demand  effect via price.  Downstream  (output)
instruments  only induce  output substitutions. These limitations  of indirect  policies are tolerable so long
as the targeted abatement  method is indeed  cheapest.  However, if input switching  is more costly than
technological  abatement, then input taxes will be less cost-effective. The substitution  elasticity for a
pollution-intensive  input has little effect on the cost-effectiveness  of an input tax.  If it is low, more
abatement will result from demand reduction; if it is high, polluters will substitute inputs.  From a
regulator's perspective,  this does not matter. However,  with low substitution  elasticities,  using an input
tax is more likely to miss a cheaper alternative,  such as installing  abatement  equipment.
Theoretically,  if the deadweight  loss  from the imposition  of indirect  taxes  (relative  to an emissions
tax) is less than the savings in administrative  costs, then indirect taxes should be used.  A small subset
of the optimal tax literature has examined  indirect taxes and externalities.? In most of these models,
23Bernstein  (1991), p. 18.
24Baumol  and Oates (1988), pp. 190-206.
25See  for example Balcer (1980); Stevens (1988); Green and Sheshinski (1976); Sandmo (1976);
Wijkander  (1985).
12the government's  goal is revenue  generation,  not environmental  quality. Thus behavioral  change, which
is  the  goal of  environmental taxes, generates efficiency losses in  these models.  For  indirect
environmental  taxes, only behavioral  change  other than that sought  by the policy should  count as a loss.
These models  also explicitly assume that a good is untaxable, rather than costly to tax.  So there is no
representation  of the trade-off between  the cost of administering  a direct tax and the welfare loss from
an indirect tax.  In sum, these models do not apply directly to the comparison  of direct and indirect
policies for environmental  protection.
The question  remains: what parameter  might best describe  the likely superiority  of indirect  over
direct policies? As a first cut, the number  of sources may be a good proxy for administrative  costs-the
higher the number, the more it seems an  indirect policy will be optimal.  Some measure of the
competence  of the environmental  regulator would also reflect  the costs of using direct policies.
Regulators  may also find it easier to enact  direct instruments  in law-abiding  societies. Japan, for
example,  has been called a "consensus  society."'2 It improved  its air quality quickly and significantly
in the 1970s, mostly because people and firms strived to achieve air quality standards set by the
government.  When the U.S.  auto industry failed to meet NO. emissions standards in the 1970's,
declaring the standards "impossible,"  the U.S. government's  bluff had been called.  It could not harm
this important  industry and instead  revoked  the standard. Meanwhile,  Japan's auto industry  successfully
achieved an equally stringent standard. 27 The more law-abiding  a society, the more its environmental
regulators  will be able to rely on self-reporting  to monitor compliance  with direct policy instruments.
Finally, when a pollutant  is non-uniformly  dispersed, even  an emissions-based  instrument  would
not be  truly direct.  Using an even more indirect instrument could well target damage better than
regulating emissions.  For  example, most pollutants from  automobile exhaust are non-uniformly
dispersed. Emissions in rural areas at night cause less damage than urban rush-hour emissions.  An
emissions  tax would ignore these different ambient  effects. An even more indirect instrument,  such as
a parking tax at downtown  garages, might target damages  better than an emissions tax would.  The
existence  of ambient  effects does not help policy makers  choose between  what have been labelled  direct
and indirect instruments; it only removes directness as a basis of comparison.  All possible policies
become effectively  indirect,  but policies that affect  proxies for emissions  may have cost-effectiveness  and
monitoring  advantages  over instruments  that target emissions.
Some situations  are especially  suitable for indirect  instruments. In developing  countries  where
the administrative  apparatus  is less sophisticated  and the informal  sector  is large, indirect  instruments  may
be the only feasible policies.  If informal enterprises  pollute a lot, regulators must look hard for their
connections  with the formal economy. Regulations  attached  to these connections  would be necessarily
indirect.  Here too, clever solutions may lie in mixing systems of regulations  with different levels of
control.  For example,  a mixed approach has been recommended  for regulating  automobile  emissions,
which are not amenable  to direct monitoring. A fuel tax, combined  with an initial  capital  tax on new cars
based on their emissions  characteristics,  would provide incentives  for reduced driving, fuel efficiency,
and the developmcnt  and use of abatement  technology.'
26Takemoto  (1989), p. 4.
2'IUAPPA  (1988), p. 83.
2'Mills  and White (1978), p. 386; Eskeland  and Jimenez (1991), p. 33.
13Control variables
The choice between  price and quantity  instruments  has been explored  in the theoretical  literature
begun by Weitzman  (1974).  If abatement  costs are certain, regulators can use either price or quantity
instruments  to achieve  the same equilibrium  level of pollution  abatement. With uncertainty  however,  the
optimal policy depends on  the  relative shapes of  the abatement cost  and  environmental benefit
functions.29  The shapes of these function  measure society's relative  sensitivity  to deviations  from either
the optimal price or quantity of environmental  protection. Intuitively, if the marginal abatement  cost
curve is steeper (relative to the benefit curve), equilibrium  abatement costs will be sensitive to the
quantity chosen, and it is less risky to use a price instrument. If the marginal  abatement cost curve is
less steep, the equilibrium  quantities  will be sensitive  to the price chosen, and it will be less risky to use
a quantity instrument.
Changes in the economy  over time provide  an analogous  situation. In the face of such change,
regulators must decide whether to stabilize  pollution levels or abatement  costs.  Quantity instruments
maintain  the overall level of pollution,  while  abatement  costs, and hence  consumer  prices, increase. Price
instruments  keep constant  the marginal  abatement  cost, but allow more pollution. As in the static case,
the preferred policy depends on the relative shapes of the abatement cost and environmental  benefit
functions.
It is difficult  to derive these functions  for actual  cases. Marginal  abatement  cost curves have, in
some instances, been approximated  by engineering  studies. While environmental  benefit functions  are
even more difficult to estimate, they have two components: the relationship  between pollution and
environmental  damage, and that between  damage  and its monetary  value. The first means  that more toxic
pollutants  will have steeper marginal  benefit curves. To the extent that environmental  quality is income
elastic,  the second aspect  implies  that wealthier  societies  will also have  steeper  benefit curves. Developed
countries, in particular, would therefore be more likely to  regulate toxic pollutants with quantity
instruments.
Price or quantity  instruments  both incur administrative  costs due to the need to monitor  emissions.
Technology instruments also face administrative  costs based on the technical and industry expertise
necessary  to require  appropriate  abatement  equipment  and monitor  its usage. The trade-off  between  these
types of administrative  costs should  determine  which control  variable  is preferable. However,  technology
instruments  are typically  not cost-effective,  either in static or dynamic  terms, because  they only operate
on one aspect  of total emissions  even when they are intended  to reduce  emissions  directly. Scrubbers  on
coal-fired  power plants, for example,  reduce  emissions  but provide  no incentive  for utilities  to use cleaner
coal or for consumers to conserve energy.  As is typical  of indirect  policies, these missing incentives
mean  that technology  instruments  do not equalize  marginal  abatement  costs  across methods  of abatement.
29See  Baumol and Oates (1988), chapter 5.  Note, however, that uncertainty  regarding  the benefits
of pollution  reduction  (the  marginal  environmental  benefit curve)  does not affect  the choice  between  price-
and quantity-based  policies.
14Table 3
Parameters Affecting Policy Choice
Policy  Choice  Theoretical  I  Measuable
Parameters  Parameters
Incentive v non-  *  variance of MACs (and ambient  0  variance of vintage of K, K/L
incentive  effects if correlated to MACs)  atios; Covariance [ambient
effects, MACs]
*  stringency  *  degree of control
*  need for dynamic efficiency  0  inflation & growth rates
O  incentives for cost minimization  *  size of public enterprise sector,
degree of competition
Direct v indirect  O  administative  cost of direct  0  number of polluters;
policies  administrative competence
0  tax compliance
*  law abiding natur  0  relevant elasticities
*  deadweight loss from indirect tax  0  transfer coefficients
*  ambient effects
Price v quantity;  O  relative slopes of MAC and MEB  0  toxicity
v technology  curves
*  development stage/ value placed  *  GDP/capita
on health
*  cost of monitoring emissions  0  ease of installing and verifying
versus technology  use of control technologies
Table 3  summarizes the theoretical parameters, and their measurable counterparts, which
determine  efficient  policy choice. In the next section,  this framework  is applied  to the problem  of urban
air pollution in four cities in order to draw some general conclusions about the design of efficient
pollution  control policies.
PART III: POLICY INSTRUMEN.  S FOR CONTROLLING URBAN AIR POLLUTION:
Four Case Studies
Urban Air Pollution
Urban air pollution is among  the most visible and widespread  of environmental  problems.  It
plagues  rich and poor neighborhoods  in both developed  and developing  countries,  and has local, regional,
surface, and global  effects. Some air contaminants  are stock pollutants,  others are fund pollutants. Major
sources  of air pollution  include  industry, transportation,  energy  production,  and households. Because  of
the variety of issues  raised by urban air pollution, it provides good examples  of the principles discussed
in the previous section.
The gaseous components  of the atmosphere  are presented  in Table 4 below. The principal  gases
(N 2 ,  02,  Argon, and CO 2)  do not naturally react with one another or  with unreactive trace gases.
Reactive trace gases, which have a finite residence duration, must be inserted into the atmosphere  by
either natural or anthropogenic  (man-made)  events.  When the sources are human, these reactive trace
gases can result in pollution  (Table 5).
15The reactive trace gases are, with the exception of SO 2, predominantly  supplied by natural
sources.  Over time the background concentrations  of these gases have remained constant.'  This
indicates  that the absorptive capacity of the troposphere, the lowest 8 to  16 km of atmosphere, has
adequately  processed the additional  contributions  of humans. On a world-wide  scale, most air pollutants
are fund pollutants.  While they can cause lasting damage, such as that from acid rain, it is related to
their flow rather than their cumulated stocks in the atmosphere.  Moreover, the damage from these
pollutants  depeiids  on the concentration  of uncontrolled  sources  as well as the volume  of their emissions.
Table 4
Components of Dry Air in the Lower Troposphere'
Principal Gases  Concentration  Residence Time
Nitrogen (N2)  73.0  %  permanent
Oxygen (02)  20.9  %  permanent
Argon  0.93  %  permanent
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)  0.032  %  20 years
Non-Reactive
Trace  Gases
Helium  5.2  ppm  permanent
Neon  18.0  ppm  permanent
Krypton  1.1  ppm  permanent
Xenon  0.086  ppm  permanent
Hydrogen  0.5  ppm  unknown
Nitrous Oxide (N20)  0.25  ppm  8-10 yrs
Reactive Trace Gases
Carbon Monoxide (CO)  0.1  ppm  0.2-0.3 yrs
Methane (CHj)  1.4  ppm  <  2yrs
Non-Methane
Hydrocarbons (HC)  0.02  ppm  unknown
Nitric Oxide (NO)  0.002Q0.2  ppm  2-8 days
Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2)  0.004-0.5  ppm  2-8 days
Ammonia (NH,)  0.020-6.0  ppm  1-4 days
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)  0.0012-0.03  ppm  1-4 days
Ozone (03)"2  0.0-0.05  ppm  unknown
In addition to the reactive pollutants, human activities produce two inert gases-both stock
pollutants-which cause environmental  problems.  Carbon dioxide, along with other greenhouse  gases,
may raise the temperature  of the earth.  Both emissions  and concentrations  of CO 2 have been increasing,
indicating  that the natural  carbon  sinks are unable  to keep  pace with carbon  sources. Chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) have no known  tropospheric  sink.  Above  the troposphere  though, they react with stratospheric
'Strauss and Mainwariig (1984), p. 3.
3 "Strauss and Mainwaring  (1984), p. 2.
32Hydrocarbons  and NO, form ozone in a reaction  which appears  to approximate  a fixed-coefficients
function. Scientists  believe  that when the VOC/NO, ratio exceeds 10, ozone production  is determined
by the amount of NO, in the atmosphere.  Similarly, when the VOC/NO, ratio is less than 8, ozone
production  is determined  by VOCs. (DF (1991), p. 2-3.)
16ozone, reducing  the earth's protection  from harmful  solar radiation. If anthropogenic  emissions  of CO 2
and CFCs ceased today, it would take decades or centuries  for the background  concertrations  of these
gases to stabilize.
Table 5
Human  and  Natuaml  Sourcs of Air Pollution 3
Ouantitv
Gas  Humwan  Natumt
(million tons/yr)
S02  146  6-12
CO  300  > 3000
NO 2 S0  60-270
NH,  4  100-200
N20  > 17  100450
HC  88  500-1800
CO 2 15,000  150,000
The first step in controlling air pollution has been to measure ambient  concentrations. Many
governments  and international  organizations  have  set targets for air quality, which constitute  upper limits
on  the  airborne concentration of  pollutants.  This  section examines four  cities  where  ambient
concentrations  for at least a subset of the criteria pollutants have exceeded  World Health Organization
(WHO) standards during the 1980s: Los Angeles, USA; Mexico City, Mexico; Cubatao, Brazil: and
Ankara, Turkey. Table 6 contains air quality standards  set by WHO and the four countries  containing
these cities.
33Strauss  and Mainwaring  (1984), p. 3).
17Table  6
Ambient Air Quality StandardsP 4
Pollutant  Standards (g/rnS  unless otherwise noted)
I hour  24  hour  I year
SO, 
WHO  350  125  40-60
USA  365  80
Brzil  365  80
Mexico  365  80
Tuftey  900  400  1!0-250
Particulates
WHO  150-230  60-90
USA  260  75
Brazil  80
Mexico  260  75
Turkey  300400  150-200
CO
CHO  30
USA  40 (35 ppm)  10 (8 hr, 9 ppm)
Brazil  40  10 (8 hr, 9 ppm)
Mexico  40  10 (8 hr)
Turkey  30
NO
WHO  400  150
USA  100
Turkey  300  100
Lead
WHO  0.5-1.0
USA  1.5 (3 months)
Mexico  1.5
Turkey  _  2.0
°zonc
WHO  120  60 (8 hr)
USA  235  .12 ppm
Mexico  235
Turkey  240
Each of the cities has topographic characteristics  that worsen the pollution problem.  Since
concentrations  of pollutants  are the problem, emissions  which are quickly dispersed pose little harm to
local populations. In locations  where winds  are stagnant,  emitted  gases linger in high concentrations,  and
the problem  is exacerbated  by thermal  inversions. Three topographic  features  cause  inversions:  proximity
to water, high altitude, and nearby mountains. These characteristics  reduce the normal tendency for air
temperature to cool with altitude, which allows hot air to keep rising, even as it cools.  When this
34Data  compiled  from various sources by Wendy  Ayres; Faiz, et. al. (1990), p. 9.
18temperature difference is reversed, because a hot air mass lies above a colder one, smoke does not
disperse into the upper atmosphere.
Once ambient  concentrations  are known,  the next  step is to construct  emissions  inventories  which
list the sources of the criteria pollutants. This task is difficult, and the uncertainties  even in emission
inventories  for large U.S. cities range between 30 and 50%.  For developing  countries the uncertainty
is probably  even greater. 35 Depending  on the objective  of the inventory,  sources can be categorized  by
process or by industry.  The type of inventory  needed  by policy makers depends on the policies under
consideration. For an output tax, an inventory  by industry  is useful while for an input tax, an inventory
by process would be more applicable. To weigh the pros and cons  of input and output  taxes, both types
of inventories  would be best.  Of course, accurate inventories  for developing  country cities by either
source category are rare.
LOS ANGELE
The Los Angeles air basin contains  the most populous  region of the most populous  state in the
U.S.  It encompasses  parts of 4 counties  and more than 12 million people. Four million more people,
and two million additional  housing units are expected  over the next 20 years, despite air quality that is
already the worst in the United States.36
The basin has well-known  geographic  characteristics  conducive  to poor air quality. It abuts the
Pacific Ocean  and is surrounded  by mountains. Sunshine  triggers  photochemical  reactions  between  VOCs
and NO=,  forming  the highest concentrations  of ozone in the nation. In winter months, inversion  layers
at ground level trap high concentrations  of CO and NO,.  High ozone concentrations  lead to poor
visibility, as a result of which some regional airports fail to meet state visibility  standards (10 miles on
days with humidity  less than 70%) up to 260 days per year.  Air pollution  has reduced  average visibility
in downtown  Los Angeles  by more than 75 percent. 37
35DF (1991), p. 7-87.
36SCAQMD  (1991), p. 3-11.
37Fawcett  (1990).
19Table  7
RELATIVE  AIR  QUALITY  IN LOS  ANOELES'
Pollutant  EPA  % of time exceeding  EPA etd
std  II  ,
1975-77  J  1988-90
Os(ppm)  .12  53  42
1 hour
PMIO  pg/rn1  150  . 16
24 hour
CO (ppm)  9.0  38  15
8 hour
NO 2 (ppm)  ..  19  2
1  hour
S02 (ppm)  0.14  0  0
24 hour
Pb 1g/m'  1.5  100  0
qtrly avg
As a case study of urban air pollution, Los Angeles has both pros and cons.  Because the
problem and ensuing regulations have been present for several decades, there are plentiful data.
However, California and Los Angeles, in particular, lead the world in the stringency of air quality
regulations. 39 So, most of the sources that could have abated emissions at low cost have already
relocated  from the region  or cleaned  up. Unlike  most cities in developing  countries,  therefore, regulators
in Los Angeles are left only with expensive options or must seek more innovative ways to reduce
pollution.
Sources of Air Pollution
Mobile, non-point  sources emit approximately  70 percent of current air pollution by weight  in
the Los Angeles basin.'  Most air pollution  from mobile sources is emitted by on-road sources (motor
vehicles). Ships, the only exception,  emit 28 percent of sulfates.
In some respects California and the U.S.  have made tremendous progress in regulating air
pollution from motor  vehicles. Fuel efficiency  standards,  accompanied  by market  pressures from higher
gasoline prices, have decreased the amount of fuel burned per vehicle mile travelled (VMT).  Sales-
weighted  fleet average fuel economy  in the U.S. has increased  from 14.9 miles per gallon in 1967  to 27.3
in 1987, up 83 percent.  In addition, catalytic  converters, which reduce  the pollution per gallon of fuel
38SCAQMD  (1991), pp. 2-2 and 2-3.
39Faiz  et al (1990), p. 73.
40SCAQMD  (1989).
20burned, have been required on 80 percent of new cars since 1975 and 100 percent since 1981.4' The
catalysts can reduce emissions  of HC by 87 percent, CO by 85 percent, and NO, by 62 percent. 42
Unfortunately  for air quality, demographic  trends in Southern  California  have operated against
these technological  improvements  in pollution control.  In 1950  there were 2.1 million motor vehicles
registered in the four-county  region. By 1980  there were more than 6.5 million, and by 2010  there are
expected  to be over 10 million. In addition, the number  of miles travelled  per vehicle  has increased, so
that total vehicle miles travelled (VMT)  has increased  even faster than the number  of vehicles.' 3
The region's population  growth and economic  growth are partly responsible  for the growth in
VMT.  But the VMT growth has derived from two other factors: the falling marginal cost of driving
because of increasing  fuel economy  and lower real gasoline  prices; and substantial  public investment  in
automobile-based  infrastructure. The  first few miles  of Southern  California's  well-known  freeway  system
were constructed in 1940.  By 1980 the region  had over 700 miles of freeways.'  So although  much
progress  has been made  to reduce  the pollution  from individual  cars, and new automobiles  emit much less
air pollution than their predecessors, the region's growth has ensured that air pollution remains a
problem, and mobile sources still account for most emissions.
Stationary sources account for the other 30 percent of Los Angeles' criteria pollutants. They
emit almost all the particulates, half the VOCs, a third of the sulfates, and a quarter of the nitrates.
However, even among  stationary sources, the distinction  between  point- and non-point  sources is useful
for policy  purposes. The vast majority  of the particulates  come from non-point  sources like paved  roads,
construction  and demolition  sites, and farming. Moreover, about two-thirds  of stationary-source  VOC
emissions  arise from solvent  use, mostly  surface  coatings  (Table 8). On the other  hand, of the stationary-
source sulfate emissions, about  a third is from petroleum  refining, and another half, along  with virtually
all of the stationary nitrate, comes from fuel cc:nbustion  at industrial  sites, electric utilities, and other
services and commerce.
41Faiz, et. al. (1990), pp. 69-71.
" 2French (1990)  cited in Faiz, et. al. (1990),  p. 69; Only 60 percent  of the hydrocarbons  emitted  from
motor vehicles pass out through the tail pipe.  The other 40 percent escape through the crankcase, the
fuel tank, and the carburetor. The other motor  vehicle  pollutants  (CO and NO) are emitted through  the
tailpipe (Strauss  and Mainwaring, 1984).
" 3Fawcett  (1990); SCAQMD  (1991), p. 3-11.
"Fawcett (1990).
21Table 8
Emissions in the Los Angeles Basin: 1987"
(percent of total average annual tons per day)°
Sourc  VOC(%)  NNO,(%)  CO(%)  SO, (%)  |  PM(%)
Stationary
Fuel combustion  1  22  2  17  I
Waste buning  0  0  0  0  0
Solvent use  34  0  0  0  0
Petrol process, storage
and transfer  8  1  0  14  0
Industrial processes  3  1  0  6  4
Misc. processes  4  0  0  0  S8*
Total Stationary  50  24  2  37  94
Mobile  I
On-mad vehicles  44  55  87  24  5
Off-road mobile  6  21  11  39
Total Mobile  50  76  98  63  6
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
*  Mostly construction and road dust.
@ Columns may not add due to rounding.
Los Angeles has had much more success controlling  emissions from point sources than from
dispersed non-point sources.  Comparing Tables 7 and 8, one can note that point sources such as
industrial processes contribute mostly to pollutants which meet, or are close to meeting, the federal
standards. The standard  most frequently  violated  is that for ozone. Los Angeles is one of the only cities
in the U.S. in which ozone levels are determined  by the level of VOCs in the air, rather than the amount
of NOX,.'  About 40 percent of VOCs are the result of the use of  evaporating  paints, petroleum
products,  and other solvents,  predominantly  by non-point  sources. Regulators  in Los Angeles  have  turned
only recently  to these activities as potential  sources of pollution reduction.
Policy Options
Serious  pollution  control efforts in Los Angeles  date back to the 1940s. At that time, regulations
were passed and enforced by the individual  cities and counties  which share the airshed. To attempt  to
deal with air pollution consistently  throughout the region, four existing county air pollution control
districts were merged in 1977 to form the South Coast Air Quality Management  District (SCAQMD).
Because  Los Angeles  has had air pollution  regulations  for so many years, the interesting  policy question
is that actually  faced by SCAQMD:  given that regulations  have been enforced for decades, and the air
is still dirty, how should policy choice be altered?
SCAQMD's goals are the U.S. ambient  standards  for air pollutants. To achieve  these goals in
Los Angeles, SCAQMD  will have to enforce much more stringent emissions  standards than the rest of
the country. In 1988,  only lead and SO 2 concentrations  met the federal standard. NO, slightly  exceeded
4 'SCAQMD (1991), p. 3-5.
'Conversation with Bill Dennison,  of Dennison  & Associates.
22the standard,  PM 1o concentrations  were twice  the standard,  and CO and 03  concentrations  were over two
and a half times the standard. Based on the emissions  data (Table 8), the regulatory emphasis  should  be
on controlling  mobile and stationary  sources of VOCs and PMIo.
Use of economic  incentives:  market  versus non-market  policies
Because  motor vehicles all use almost  identical  technology,  the variance  of marginal  abatement
costs should be low.  And although a continuum  of model years exists, retrofitting old models with
control equipment  appears  prohibitively  expensive. An oil company's  offer in Los Angeles  to purchase
and scrap pre-1971 cars for $700 apiece suggests  that retiring older cars is roughly comparable  in cost
to adding  catalysts  to new ones. However, abatement  costs  may still differ  at the margin  because  drivers
derive widely  varying  benefits  from using  vehicles. So, despite  similar  technologies,  some incentive-based
measures  may still have a cost-effectiveness  advantage  in controlling  automobile  emissions.
In Los Angeles, automobile  emissions have been regulated  for decades, suggesting  that these
sources have already used the cheapest available  methods  of abatement;  further reduction  will come at
a higher cost.  In addition, even though SCAQMD  has historically  used non-incentive  regulations,  cost-
effectiveness  has been an  important consideration in their design. 47 To the extent that regulators
succeeded  in roughly equating  marginal  abatement  costs across sources, many  of the gains to be had from
relying on incentive-based  systems for sources already being regulated  may already have been realized.
For these reasons, additional  incentive-based  policies to control emissions  from mobile sources may not
be much  more cost effective  in Los Angeles.
Stationary  non-point  sources of VOC emissions,  however, may provide a more attractive  target
for  incentive-based  policies.  Until recently these sources were not controlled.  There are many
technologies  involved  in controlling  their emissions,  and thus there is likely a high variance  of marginal
abatement  costs.  Also, since stationary  non-point  sources are only just beginning  to be controlled,  they
will face less stringent  controls. Thus, incentive-based  policies  are more likely  to provide  efficiency  gains
in Los Angeles if used for stationary non-point  sources rather than for mobile sources.
Level of Control: direct versus indirect policies
SCAQMD is a  relatively capable regulatory agency with an  1989 budget of $72 million,
including  salaries  and employee  benefits  of $40 million. Its Air Quality  Management  Plans demonstrate
that it has detailed information about emissions, ambient air quality, and abatement technologies.
SCAQMD should be capable  of monitoring  fairly complex instruments. However, it is not clear that
setting  up monitoring  systems  for direct policies would  be the most cost-effective  investment  to make in
Los Angeles.  Non-point sources are obviously the most difficult to monitor.  A biennial vehicle
inspection  system is already in place in California,  and reportedly  cost consumers  $190 million  and state
and local governments  $130 million  in 1988."8 Setting  up systems to monitor emissions  of other non-
point sources is likely to be even more expensive  than for vehicles. So despite the fact that SCAQMD
is a  capable regulator, the sources of emissions of VOCs and PM,o in Los Angeles may not lend
themselves  very well to the use of direct policies.
4 7Hahn and Noll (1982).
CARB (1990b).
23Moreover, most of the damage from non-point emissions of VOCs and PM,o is local, with
pronounced ambient effects that depend on the time and location  of emissions.  If a combination  of
indirect  instruments  can be identified  that better matches  these  ambient  effects, damages  could  be reduced
at a lower cost than with direct policies.
Control variable: price or quantity versus technology
The remaining  mobile  and non-point  source  pollutants  (lead  has already  been  virtually  eliminated)
are not highly  toxic at their current levels in Los Angeles. But given  their affluence,  residents  may place
relatively  more value on pollution reduction. These two considerations  have  opposite  effects  on the slope
of the environmental  benefit curve, leaving no clear choice between  price and quantity instruments.
Technology  instruments  in Los Angeles are starting to get expensive. The low cost solutions
have been implemented,  leaving only high-cost  options which do less to improve  air quality. 4'  Vehicle
control equipment  consumes  79% of annual consamer expenditures  on mobile source pollution control
in California.5  While this figure does not represent marginal abatement costs, it demonstrates  the
predominance  of technological  controls. Catalysts  add $360 to $1080 (or 4% to 20%) to the price of new
vehicles. 5"  The more expensive  these tailpipe  abatement  technologies  get, the more efficient  it is to rely
on demand reduction or process changes, such as fuel switching.
Surprisingly,  controls  of mobile  sources  seem  to have  been more  effective  than stationary-  source
controls.  Though California consumers  spent two-thirds of their pollution control dollars on mobile
sources, these generated  79% of the overall reduction  in emissions  in 1989.52  Although these figures,
which include the costs of regulatory programs, suggest that the average costs of targeting  emissions
reductions  from mobile sources has been lower they say nothing about the relative marginal abatement
costs which may in fact be lower for a variety of non-point  stationary  sources.
The above discussion suggests that SCAQMD's next step towards attainment  of the federal
standards should consist of a combination  of indirect incentive-based  instruments  aimed at non-point
stationary sources of VOCs. The choice  of these indirect  policies, implemented  through taxes either on
inputs  or outputs  related to emissions  of VOCs  and PM,o  requires  detailed  analysis  about  substitution  and
demand elasticities  and abatement  technologies. The example  of surface coating (paint, etc.) illustrates
this point.  Such coatings contribute  almost 20 percent of the VOCs emitted in Los Angeles.  Millions
of consumers  buy painting  services  from thousands  of contractors. Directly  targeting either group, with
regulatory  or incentive-based  instruments  would  be prohibitively  costly  to administer. Instead,  SCAQMD
developed a proposal to tax the relatively small number of manufacturers  of surface coating.  Los
Angeles' location  in the middle of a large desert would help prevent large-scale  smuggling  of untaxed
coating.  Although the plan was eventually  abandoned  because of legal problems, it demonstrates  how
cost-effective  indirect  instruments  could be designed  for specific cases.
49Hahn  (1980), A Primer, p. 99.
ICARB (1990), Consumer Cost, p. 2.
51 Faiz et al (1990), p. 69.
52CARB  (1990), Consumer Cost, p. 2.
24Table 9  South Coast Air Basin Average Paily Emissions (Peercnt  of Total)
VOC  Co  NOx  SOx  PM  PN1O
STATIONARY  SOURCES
Fuel Combustion
O0t  and  gas production  0.2  0.1X  2.7X  0.2  0.0X  0.02
Petroleum  refining  0.22  0.22  4.1X  2.8X  0.2  0.3X
Other  manufacturing/industrial  0.22  0.32  5.12  4.22  0.12  0.22
Electric  utilities  0.12  0.22  3.92  2.8%  0.1X  0.12
Other  services  and  commerce  0.32  0.32  3.72  7.12  0.12  0.22
Residential  0.12  0.32  3.12  0.6%  0.12  0.22
Other  0.22  0.22  1.22  1.12  0.02  0.12
Total  Fuel  Combustion:  1.32  1.62  23.72  18.7X  0.72  1.2%
Waste  Burning
Agricultural--debris  0.02
Range  management  0.02  0.0X  0.02  0.02
Incineration  0.02  0.12  0.12  0.02
Other  0.72  0.02  0.12  0.32  0.02  0.02
Total  Waste  Burning:  0.72  0.12  0.22  0.32  0.12  0.12
Solvent  Use
Dry  cleaning  1.32
Degreasing  2.02
Architectural  coating  6.12
Other  surface  coating  12.52  0.0X  0.12  0.12
Asphalt  paving  0.42
Printing  0.72  0.02
Consumer  products  5.32
IndustriaL  solvent  use  1.46
Other  0.82
Total  Solvent  Use:  30.42  0.02  0.12  0.12
Petroteum  process,  storage  &  trans
Oil  and  gas  extraction  2.32  0.02  0.12  1.8X  0.02  0.02
Petroleum  refining  1.32  0.12  0.72 13.82 0.22  0.22
Petroleum  marketing  3.32  0.02  0.19  0.02
Other  0.12  0.02  0.02  0.02
Total  Petroleum  Process:  7.02  0.12  0.82  15.62 0.22  0.22
25Table  2  (cont.)
VOC  CO  NOx  SOx  PM  PN10
...................  ..................................................................
Industrial  Processes
Chemical  0.7%  0.0%  0.1%  2.7%  0.1%  0.1%
Food  and  agricultural  1.6%  0.0%  0.0%  1.2%  1.5%
Mineral  processes  0.0%  0.0%  0.7%  2.9%  0.4%  0.5%
Metal  processes  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.5%  0.4%  0.7%
Wood  and  paper  0.7%  0.9%
Other  0.8%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Total  Industrial  Processes:  3.2%  0.1%  1.1%  6.1%  2.9%  3.8%
Misc  Processes
Pesticide  application  0.9%
Farming  operations  2.9%  3.5%  3.1%
Construction  and  demolition  18.7%  22.1%
Entrained  road  dust--paved  59.2%  52.7%
Entrained  road  dust--unpaved  3.4%  3.8%
Unplanned  fires  0.7%  2.4%  0.2%  0.9%  1.5%
Waste  disposal  0.4%
Natural  sources  5.5%  5.1%
Other  0.2%  0.0%  0.1%  0.2%  0.0%  0.1%
Total  Nisc  Processes:  4.2%  2.4%  0.3%  0.2%  91.1%  88.4%
TOTAL  STATIONARY  SOURCES:  46.8%  4.3% 26.0%  40.9%  95.0%  93.9%
MOBILE  SOURCES
On  Road  Vehicles
Light  duty  passenger  32.1% 54.2% 31.2% 12.1%  2.0X  1.7%
Light  and  mediun  duty  trucks  10.2%  18.5%  10.1%  4.7%  0.5%  0.5%
Heavy  duty  gas  trucks  2.4%  10.6%  4.6%  2.4%  0.1%  0.1%
Heavy  duty  diesel  trucks  1.8%  1.4%  13.8%  5.8%  1.5%  2.5%
Motorcycles  0.7%  0.5%  0.2%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0%
Heavy  duty  diesel  urban  buses  0.1%  0.1%  1.2%  0.3%  0.1%  0.2%
Total  On  Road  Vehicles:  47.3%  85.4%  61.1%  25.5%  4.3%  5.0%
Other  Mobile
Off  road  vehicles  1.7%  2.0%  1.0%  1.1%  0.0%  0.1%
Trains  0.3%  0.1%  1.7%  1.7%  0.1%  0.1%
Ships  0.1%  0.1%  3.1%  27.5%  0.1%  0.2%
Aircraft--goverment  0.7%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  0.1% 0.2%
Aircraft-other  0.6%  1.3%  1.2%  0.7%  0.0% 0.0%
Mobile equipment  1.4%  3.6%  5.4%  2.1%  0.3%  0.5%
Utility  equipment  1.0%  2.8%  0.2%  0.2%  0.0%  0.0%
Total  Other  Mobile:  5.9%  10.3% 12.9% 33.7%  0.7%  1.2%
TOTAL  MOBILE  SOURCES  53.2%  95.7% 74.0%  59.1%  5.0%  6.1%
TOTAL  SOUTH  COAST  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
SOURCE:  CARB.  "Emission  Inventory  1987."  March  1990.
26MEXICO CITY METROPOLITAN AREA
Los Angeles is a good case study because  data about  sources  of emissions  and ambient  air quality
are abundant. However, it may be a bad model  for developing  countries  because  of its relative  affluence,
and because  air pollution  has been regulated  for decades. Mexico  City  faces similar air quality  problems,
but until recently  pollution sources were mostly  unregulated.
The Mexico City Metropolitan  Area (MCMA) covers 1250 km 2, including  the Federal District
(DF) and 17  surrounding  municipalities  in the State  of Mexico. About  half its 20 million  people  currently
live in the DF, but this number  has been  shrinking. Population  growth in the MCMA is currently about
5%-1.3%  in the DF and 8.8  % outside the DF.  People are migrating  from rural areas and other cities
to the Mexico City and from the DF to the surrounding  municipalities.  So although  the people and
industries  of Mexico  have increasingly  concentrated  in the MCMA, the relative  density of the city itself
has declined,  as the metropolitan  area has spread into the Valley  of Mexico.
The concentration  in Mexico  City has been partly induced  by policy.  Mexican  industrialization
began in the 1940s,  spurred by government  incentives  and distorted  prices which favored location  in the
capital.'  In  1930 Mexico City had 3180 industrial establishments,  6.8% of the establishments  in
Mexico.  By 1980  it had 38,492, 29% of the establishments  in Mexico. These establishments  employed
47% of Mexico's  labor force and produced  48% of the country's  GDP. This concentration  has probably
decreased somewhat in the last few years due to the establishment  of free trade zones along the U.S.
border. 55
Like Los Angeles, Mexico City's topography is not conducive to concentrated industry and
population. Because  it lies in a high altitude  valley (2240 meters)  surrounded  by mountains,  atmospheric
inversions  are frequent. The combination  of high altitude and low latitude provide ample sunlight for
the photochemical  reactions which produce smog.  In addition, the altitude reduces the efficiency of
internal  combustion  engines, increasing  their emissions  of HC by 30% and CO by 100% relative to sea
level.'
Particulates  and ozone present the biggest  air quality problems  in the MCMA (Table 10).  Next
in order of severity are CO and S02.  But because its health effects are exacerbated  by Mexico  City's
altitude, and the Mexican  standards are relatively lax, the CO problem may be worse than is indicated
by the frequency  with which Mexican  standards are exceeded. 57
53Sebastian  (1990), "Mexico  City diagnostic," p. 5.
sDF (1991), p. 2-22.
55DF (1991), p. 4-15; and Harris and Puente (1990), p. 506.
56Harris  and Puente (1990), p. 506.
5'DF (1991), p. 7-26.
27Table 10
Relative Air Quality in the MCMA_  _
Pollutant  VWHO  EPA  Mexican  std  % of time  Max concentration  Annual
std  std  exceeding  1  arithmetic
Mexican std  avg
(ppm)  0.10  0.12  0.11  88%  0.44
I hour
TSPEugrn  260  260  275  .130  520r
24  hour__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
CO (ppm)  9  9  13  20%  24
S  hour__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
N02 (ppm)  0.21  --  0.2  6%  .32  0.13
1  hour  . ._._._.__.._..
S%2 (ppm)  - 0 14  0.13  1%  .14  0.061
24 hour  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Pb pg/rn 3 0.5-  1.5  _  _  2.4  1.8
qtly avg  1.00
*Annu geometic mean.
*  Yearly  average  range.
Mexico  City is also burdened by several more toxic air pollutants, such as lead and fecal dust.
Some of these have obvious direct technical solutions. To get lead out of the air, Mexico  has begun
introducing  unleaded gasoline. To eliminate  airborne fecal dust, sewers need to be built to serve more
of the population. Currently 30% of Mexico City residents  are without  sewerage."
Until recently, virtually no abatement  equipment  had been installed  by either transportation  or
industry. As a result, Mexico  City has often  been called  the most polluted city in the world. (Tihis  label
is used lightly, and has been attached to many cities.)  For some pollutants, ambient  levels may be six
hundred times the accepted standard  for humans, and air pollution is thought to cause or contribute  to
90 percent of the region's respiratory illnesses.'  As a result of the mounting crisis (and partly as a
result of  bilateral pressures involved with the Free Trade Agreement), a  consensus in  favor of
environmental  regulation  finally seems to have developed.
Sources of Air Pollution
Substantial amounts of pollution are emitted by 4000 of the approximately  30,000 industrial
establishments  in Mexico  City, due to their size and the nature of their processes. The worst offenders
are petroleum  refineries, petrochemical  plants, iron and steel foundries, non-metallic  mineral extraction
38DF (1991), pp. 7-9 to 7-24; WHO (1988), pp. 63 and 67.
5'Schteingart  (1989), p. 43.
°Schteingart  (1989), p. 43.
28and processing,  pulp and paper plants, and lead, aluminum,  grey iron, copper, and alloy foundries. For
many of these industries,  abatement  equipment  is either absent  or deficient. 61
A few of the worst industrial  sources are remarkably  concentrated  (Table 12). Power  generation
by the Jorge Luque and Valle de Mexico plants contributes 9 percent of air pollution from industry,
commercial, and service sources, and 28 percent of SO 2 from all sources.  Six percent of all VOC
emissions  come from fuel production, storage, and distribution.P But the rest of the stationary  sources
are dispersed widely.  Waste disposal accounts  for 20% of VOCs emitted from all sources.  Service
facilities, classified  under stationary  area sources, include  twelve  thousand  public baths, bakeries,  hotels,
hospitals, and clubs.  These sources use a  variety of fuels including fuel oil, diesel and liquified
petroleum  gas (LPG), while dry cleaners use a number  of organic solvents.
The bulk of Mexico  City's air pollution,  however, is generated  by transportation. Mobile  sources
combined emit 76 percent of pollution in the MCMA, half from 2.6 million private vehicles, and half
from 56,500 taxis, 7500 buses (of which 3500 are Ruta 100, the state-owned  bus system), 54,500
collective  vehicles, and 256,000 trucks.'  A recent consultant's report (DF 1991, p.3-34) concluded
that because  earlier planning  and technological  choices  favored  highway-oriented  modes, including  buses
and microbuses, attempts to reduce air pollution from mobile sources by reversing this trend would
involve substantial  costs.
Two technical issues dominate  the transport problem.  First, the gasoline burned by Mexico
City's vehicles  is not correctly  manufactured  for its altitude  and low oxygen concentration. The resulting
inefficient combustion  causes excess pollution.  Second, the diesel oil used by vehicles and industry
contains  unusually  high sulfur concentrations. Desulfurization  before  combustion  would reduce  ambient
SO2 levels significantly.
To address  the current air quality  crisis in Mexico  City, attention  can  be limited  to a few sources.
The two power plants and the refinery (since closed) combine for 6% of NO, and 35% of SO,.
Miscellaneous  industrial  sources, a more difficult  target, emit 13%  of NO. and 25% of SO,,. But despite
these sources' high profiles and relative ease of regulation,  controlling  their emissions  will not clean up
Mexico's air enough or for long.  The major target should be mobile source emissions  which are too
important  and growing  too fast to ignore. Private  cars alone emit 25% of VOCs  and 24% of NO,, which
combine  to make ozone, Mexico  City's worst pollutant,  as well as 45% of CO.  Other mobile sources,
mostly  trucks and buses, many  of which are state owned, contribute  about the same amount.
Policy Options
Use of economic incentives: market versus non-market policdes
There is probably considerable  variation in marginal  abatement  costs across sources in Mexico
City.  The fact that little abatement existed as of the late 1980s  means that initial abatement will cost
relatively  little.  Standards will not need to be stringent, relative to Los Angeles for example, and the
cost-effectiveness  gains from implementing  market solutions  may be large.
61DF (1991), p. 2-31.
'DF (1991), p. 2-33.
63DF  (1991), pp. 2-33 and 3-8.
29On the other hand, some considerations  do not favor the use of economic  incentives  as part of
the solution  in Mexico  City.  The public sector does play a role in many of the source categories. The
large point sources and half the bus fleet are state-owned. In the long run, to stem the growth of vehicle
miles travelled the public transport system must be improved. Where public sector enterprises cannot
be  assumed to  minimize costs, incentive-based  regulations will not necessarily be  cost-effective.
However, the largest source of air pollution  in Mexico  City-privately owned  vehicles-will be amenable
to the use of incentive-based  policies.
Level of control: direct versus indirect policies
Unlike  Los Angeles,  Mexico  City lacks  a well-supported  enviromnental  regulator. Most analysts
agree that Mexico  City's environmental  regulatory  agency, SEDUE,  does not have  the skill to implement
many of Mexico's current regulations, nor the ability to administer  sophisticated  direct instruments.'
Its Secretary has complained  that it lacks adequate  financial  resources, administrative  mechanisms,  and
legal authority  to perform its job satisfactorily. 0
A further reason to doubt the applicability  of direct instruments  for pollution control in Mexico
City is the variety and diffusion  of emissions  sources. Most emissions  come  either from mobile  sources
or from non-point  industrial  sources.  A World Bank study concluded  that:
"apart from  the current shortage of  staff  in  a  situation of  strong
budgetary  constraints,  the sheer scale of the problem  involving  more  than
one thousand plants included in  contingency  plans for  air pollution
emergency alert, hundreds of thousands of vehicle-trips in the city
streets, and some very powerful industrial complexes raises serious
questions about the feasibility of  implementing  the pollution control
strategies  through direct administrative  controls."I
The only sources which present obvious  targets for direct price, quantity or technology  instruments  are
the two power plants and the PEMEX  refinery.  In fact, SEDUE closed  the refinery in March .1991.
As in Los Angeles, ambient  effects may also reduce  the relative efficiency  of direct instruments
in this case. Vehicle emissions  have  different effects  during morning  rush hour and for weekend  driving
outside  the city. Therefore  emissions-based  controls  may not be most efficient  even if they were feasible.
Indirect controls, such as a downtown  parking  tax, may approximate  ambient  effects  and damages more
closely.
Control variable: price or quantity versus technology
In the short-run, Mexico  City faces a crisis. There is little room for uncertainty  in the quantity
of pollution reduction.  As a result, quantity or technology instruments dominate  price instruments.
Pollution  reduction  technologies  which  have been  used in developed  countries  for years, such as catalysts,
unleaded gasoline, and inspection equipment, might tempt Mexican authorities  to impose technology
"Harris and Puente (1990), p. 514.
"DuMars and Beltran Del Rio (1988), p. 807.
66Sebastian  (1990), "Mexico  City diagnostic,"  p. 39.
30standards. Also, the two existing problems  with Mexico  City's transport  fuels, high sulfur content and
inefficient combustion  at altitude, are appealing  targets for technical controls.  However, technology
standards  are not dynamically  cost-effective. To mitigate  this inefficiency,  SEDUE  might  consider  using
quantity instruments  where the standard is set according  to currently available  technology. This would
allow industrial sources or vehicle manufacturers  to comply with the regulations in the short run by
installing  available  equipment  and in the long run by developing  alternative  technologies.
For the few point sources that emit substantial pollution, direct non-incentive  quantity or
technology instruments  are probably optimal.  For the more diffuse industrial sources and the mobile
sources, indirect incentive-based  quantity  or technology  instruments  make more sense if precision about
pollution abatement  is valued highly.
This discussion  suggests  that a combination  of policies, differentiated  by type of source, may be
efficient. For point sources that are large polluters, such as the power plants,  direct non-incentive  based
quantity or technology policies are efficient.  For the non-point stationary sources and state-owned
vehicles, non-incentive  technology  policies  such as replacing  engines  and installing  abatement  equipment
would be appropriate  at least in the short run.  Finally, for privately-owned  vehicles, indirect  ;ncentive-
based price instruments such as a gasoline tax would be cost-effective  and administratively  feasible.
Currently, Mexican  gasoline  prices are among  the lowest in the world (Table 11).
Table  11
Regular Unleaded Retail Gasoline Prices 6
(January 1992)'
Country  S/Lallon
Italy  $4.55  S3.32
Japan  3.62  1.58
Netherlands  3.74  2.66
Franee  3.39  2.47
U.K.  3.06  1.94
Mexico  1.55  .14
U.S.A.  1.09  .34
a  Except Netherlands (February  1992)  and Mexico (November 1991).
Although  fuel taxes will reduce the overall amount of driving and shift demand  to other, possibly less
polluting  modes (depending  on the demand  elasticity),  they will not induce  car owners  to install  abatement
equipment. Therefore, a fuel  tax would  have  to be supplemented  with other indirect  policies--regulatory,
such as mandatory  emissions  standards  and inspection  programs and retrofitting  of high-use  vehicles for
cleaner  fuels, as well as incentive-based,  including  automobile  taxes based on emissions  characteristics.'
6 'Eegg DLetente,  June 28 and July 18, 1991.
'For  a detailed  cost-effectiveness  analysis  of many of these options with and without a fuel tax, see
Eskeland (1991).
31What has Mexico done?
Until recently, most attempts  to combat Mexico  City's growing air quality problem had failed.
The first National Urban Development  Plan began in 1978. Despite its goal to discourage  the growth
of the MCMA, the federal share of investment  in the MCMA grew from 1984 to  1988, which may
indicate rising subsidies for locating  in Mexico  City.  Recent plans continue to profess the intention  to
move business away from Mexico City.'  SEDUE operates a computerized  network of 25 automatic
air quality monitoring stations  throughout  Mexico  City.  Unfortunately,  SEDUE considers  less than 80
percent of the data they generate to be valid, less than 50 percent from some stations.  Plans for an
upgrade of the systems  do exist.? 0
The policies that have been effective are direct, largely non-incentive  based, and applied to
stationary point sources.  Since 1982-83,  Mexico  has stopped licensing  new manufacturing  in the DF.
In addition, 17 industries  have been singled  out for encouragement  to move  outside  the city. Relocation
incentives  include  the construction  of approximately  350 industrial  parks, the creation of free industrial
zones at the southern  and northern  borders of the city, and the provision  of training, administration,  and
credit facilities."  Since 1986, PEMEX has produced a special light fuel oil with 3 percent sulfur (as
opposed to 4.2 percent normally), which now has 42 percent of the market in the MCMA.
In 1989 Mexico  launched  a three-stage  attack  on air pollution  because  air quality was continuing
to deteriorate (Table 4).  So far it has been made up entirely of non-incentive  and largely indirect
measures. The "Emergency"  program ran froim  1989  to 1990. In 1993, Mexico  will be the first Latin
American country to  build cars to  U.S.  emissions standards.'  A  vehicle inspection program,
implemented  in 1989,  requires annual checks  on all gasoline  and diesel vehicles. It is virtually  identical
to the first U.S. programs of the early 1980s."  Mexico appears  to be headed in the direction that the
U.S. has taken with regard to mobile sources.
Additional  mobile  source controls  include  the replacement  of engines  for taxis  and 3500 Ruta 100
city buses, the Hoy no Circula (HNC) program that restricts automobile  use, gas retrofits for high-use
vehicles, gasoline additives  to improve  vehicle efficiency  at altitude, and the expulsion  of cars from 50
square blocks in the city center.  The HNC program is particularly noteworthy  because it provides an
example  of an indirect policy where ill-considered  incentives  have produced  perverse results.  Under
HNC, each car is banned from driving for one weekday. The plan has backfired, with families  having
purchased  second cars, usually  older and dirtier, rather than face time on Mexico  City's crowded  public
transport system.
Many of these non-incentive  indirect measures, including vehicle inspections and mandated
technology  have been used in Los Angeles. In the face of growing  demand for driving, these have not
cleaned  Los Angeles' air and they will not be enough  to improve  Mexico  City's.  To reduce  the demand
for driving, it may be more effective for Mexico  City to combine  these with a policy that Los Angeles
has not adopted-raise gasoline  taxes in line with those in Western Europe.
0 DF (1991), pp. 5-1 and 5-17 to 5-22.
'ODF  (1991), p. 2-35.
7 "Sebastian (1990), "Mexico  City diagnostic,"  p. 35.
72Sebastian  (1990), "Mexico  City diagnostic,"  p. 36.
7DF (1991), p. 1.
32For point sources, recent efforts include closure of  the PEMEX refinery, mandatory fuel
switching for dozens of industries, and gas substitution at power plants.  SEDUE has also signed
agreements  with pollution-intensive  industries, so that when the air pollution reaches critical levels,
SEDUE can close factories temporarily.  By 1990  there had been several such closures. 7'  As noted
before, this type of command  and control policy has been  advocated  as a complement  to incentive-based
instruments,  since it provides more flexible  reactions to unpredictable  weather  changes.
Currently Mexico  is in the middle of its "Integrated"  or "Short-term"  program, which will run
through 1992.  It will be followed  by a "Medium-term"  program, which will run from 1992 through
1997. Table 14 compares  Mexico  City's plan with SCAQMD's. Regulators  in neither city plan to use
incentives  extensively. Not surprisingly,  Los Angeles'  technological  plans appear  to be many years ahead
of Mexico  City's.  While Mexico  will be building  sewers  and solid waste dumps, Los Angeles  hopes to
be achieving  drastic reductions  in transportation  emissions  from unspecified  technological  advances. It
is unclear as to which city's plans are more realistic. The second noticeable  difference  between  the two
plans is that Los Angeles  has given up on public transport  options  while Mexico  City  has not.  Both  cities
are currently investing  in public transportation,  but only Mexico City has considered  this investment  a
part of its campaign  against air pollution. Again, it is difficult  to tell which is more realistic.
74Sebastian  (1990), "Mexico  City diagnostic," p. 25.
33Tabl
EMISSIONS INVENTORY FOR MEXICO CITY METRO AREA
(tons/year)
VOC  PM  NOx  SOx  CO
Stationary point sources:  ----
Power  plants (2)  113  3,545  6,613  58,247  560
Oil refinery  (1)  6,402  1,154  3,233  14,781  52,645
Oil  marketing  & storage  25,328  0  0  0  0
Foundries  (39)  0  1,279  83  455  6,770
Non-metallic  minerals  (12)  49  4,123  5,512  13,254  18
Petrochemical  plants (231  3,511  2,593  0  4  7,131
Pulp  & paperplant  (1)  0  35  0  724  0
Industr  a  comb.  sources  191  2,212  23,288  51,295  1,897
TOTAL:  35,594  14,941  38,729  138,760  69,021
Stationary  Area Sources:
Commercial  and services  121  2,469  3,988  22,060  466
Burning wastes  7,456  3,578  785  131  22,227
Dry  cleaning  7,838  0  0  0  0
Architectural  coating  6,148  0  0  0  0
Other  coating  17,176  0  0  0  0
Printing  processes  2,981  0  0  0  0
Degreasing  agents  2,087  0  0  0  0
Agricultural  activities  0  5,293  0  0  0
Re-entrained  road  dust  0  224,973  0  0  0
Forest fires  881  623  146  0  5,135
Waste disposal  (old and new)  115,619  0  0  0  0
TOTAL:  160,307 236,936  4,919  22,191  27,828
Mobile  Sources:
Private  cars  141,059  4,398  41,976  3,557  1,328,133
Taxis  31,986  997  9,518  806  301,162
Collectives  33,904  945  8,412  554  338,589
Light gas  8,844  117  1,647  301  65,892
Buses  7,737  841  26,320  18,286  18,872
Transport  trucks  67,864  1,186  16,994  2,760  779,585
Diesel  heavy  trucks  7,293  923  26,126  955  16,515
Other  mobile  sources  36  26  192  19  139
Aircraft  operations  1,657  116  2,506  232  4,901
TOTAL:  300,380  9,549  133,691  *44,774  2,853,788
Natural  Sources,  TOTAL:  75,820  189,173  0  0  0
TOTAL  ALL SOURCES:  572,101 450,599  177,339 205,725  2,950,637
*  This column  does not  add  due  to an error in  the source.
Source:  DF (1991),  pp. 2-36,  7-31,  7-35,  7-45,  7-48,  7-71.
34EMISSIONS INVENTORY  FOR MEXICO CITY METRO AREA
(percent  of total)
VOC  PM  NOx  SOx  CO
Stationary point sourcess  ----  ---  ----  ----
Power plants (2)  0%  1%  4%  28%  0%
Oil refinery (1)  1%  0%  2%  7%  2%
Oil marketing & storage  4%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Foundries (39)  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Non-metallic minerals  (12)  0%  1%  3%  6%  0%
Petrochemical plants  (23)  1%  1%  0%  0%  0%
Pulp & paper plant  (1)  0%  0%  0%  0%  0t
Industrial comb. sources  0%  0%  13%  25%  0%
TOTAL:  6%  3%  22%  67%  2%
Stationary Area Sources:
Commercial and services  0%  1%  2%  11%  0%
Burning wasteo  it  1%  0%  0%  1%
Dry cleaning  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Architectural coating  1%  0t  0t  0%  0%
Other coating  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Printing processes  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Degreasing agents  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Agricultural activities  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%
Re-entrained road dust  0%  50%  0%  0%  0%
Forest fires  0%  0.  0%  0%  0%
Waste disposal (old and new)  20%  0%  0%  0%  0%
TOTAL:  28%  53%  3%  11%  1%
Mobile Sources:
Private cars  25%  1%  24%  2%  45%
Taxis  6%  0%  5%  0%  10%
Collectives  6%  0%  5%  0%  11%
Light gas  2%  0%  1%  0%  2%
Buses  1%  0%  15%  9%  1%
Transport trucks  12%  0%  10%  1%  26%
Diesel heavy trucks  1%  0%  15%  0%  1%
Other mobile sources  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
Aircraft operations  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%
TOTAL:  53%  2%  75%  *  22%  97%
Natural Sources,  TOTAL:  13%  42%  0%  0%  0%
TOTAL ALL SOURCES:  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%
*  This column does not add due to an error in the source.
Source: DF (1991), pp. 2-36, 7-31, 7-35, 7-45, 7-71.
35Table 14
Comparing Two Polution Control Plans
LOS  ANGELES  I  MEXICO  CITY
Tier I (by 1993)  Emergency program (1989-90)
*  new solvent technologies  *  emissions std  for now 1991 vehicles
*  technologies for petroleum production & distribution  0  Hoy no Circula
*  add on controls for industrial procosses  0  oxygenate gasoline (5% MUTE)
*  energy conservation measures  0  inspection & mainenanc
*  pesticide restrictions  0  fuel switching oil-fired power plants to natural gas
*  offsetting new sources  0  replacement of bus engines
*  beat available retrofit control technology  *  expanded emissions monitoring
*  phase out fuel oil and coal use
o  tighten new source review stds
*  motor vehicle controls
*  urban tanspost  planning
Tier 11  (by 2000)  Short-term program (1990.1992)
*  40% use of low-emitting passenger vehicles  0  improve quality of oil-based fuels
*  70% low-emitting freight vehicles  *  resttucture urban transpout
*  100% low-emitting tmansit  buses  0  modemize production technologies
*  50% reduction in off-road mobile emissions  *  imprvo  vehicle and industty emissions monitoring
*  50% reduction in solvent & coating emissions  0  ban now poluting  and relocate existing poUuting
*  50% reduction in fuel combustion emissions  0  protect and recover fragile areas
*  build sewera and solid wase  dumrF
Tier IIl  Medium4-em program (1992-97)
*  extremely low-emitting technologies for vehicles  *  study to control VOCs in solventcoatings,  emissions
from industiy, tansport,  publio sector, land use, other
mobile
*  traffic control, I/M,  CNO & LPG flects
*  fuel refonnation
*  public transporttiton
SCAQMD (1989).. p.  15-16_  21-27; DF (1991), pp. 6-1 to 6-2.
36CUBATAQ
Thirty years ago the district of Cubatao, 162 sq. km. in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, was a
sparsely  populated agrarian region devoted mostly  to banana plantations. But because it is 20 km west
of Santos (Brazil's busiest port) and 69 km from Sao Paulo, one of the largest cities in the world,
Cubatao was targeted for development  as an industrial  center.' 5
Today Cubatao  has a population  of about 100,000  and contains  Brazil's largest concentration  of
petrochemical  activity, as well as steel mills and other heavy industry.  In 1983  the region produced  a
major portion of Brazil's industrial intermediate  goods, amounting  to $1 billion in exports.
Table 15
Cubatao Produces Much of Bmazil's  Industrial Intermediate Goods
7'
Percent of
Product  Brazil's total (1983)
nitrogen  47 %
steel  40
fertilizers  38
phosphoric acid  32
polyethylene  30
chlorosoda  25
bottled gas  18
gasoline  12
Unfortunately  for the local environment,  Cubatao's atmosphere does not have the absorptive
capacity  to handle  the air pollution  emitted  by that much industry. Like Los Angeles, it lies between  an
ocean and mountains (the Atlantic and Serra do Mar in this case).  On winter mornings, surface
inversions are frequent, trapping air pollutants near ground level.  Despite this, growth proceeded
unchecked  and unplanned. By 1981  Cubatao  had become known  as "the valley of death" and "the most
polluted place on earth."  No birds or insects  lived there.  A member of the city council claimed  not to
have  seen a star for 20 years.  The city had only one kilometer  of sewerage, and no garbage collection.
Respiratory  diseases flourished,  and the infant mortality  rate in the first year of life was 35 percent, 10
times the Sao Paulo state average.7 In 1980,  average daily TSP was 1200  pg/i 3, well in excess of Sao
Paulo state standards in which 625 micrograms  constitute  a state of "alert," and 875 an "emergency."78
Atmospheric  studies have shown that Cubatao is really divided into two separate air basins:
Cubatao-Centro  and Cubatao-Vila  Parisi.'  Hit hardest by the pollution were the 15,000 people living
in  Vila Parisi, an  impoverished neighborhood  adjacent to  many of the sources, notably fertilizer
companies  and steel mills.9  Air quality standards  for particulates  and ozone in Vila Parisi were violated
72 percent of the time from 1984  to 1986.
'5Nogueira  (1988), p. 10.
" 6Findley  (1988), p. 52.
"Findley (1988), p. 52.
'Findley  (1988)  pp. 53; and CETESB  (1986), p. 20.
'CETESB (1986), p. 8.
tmCETESB  (1986), p.  11.
37In addition to  causing health problems, the air pollution produced acidic rains that killed
vegetation  on the slopes of Serra do Mar.  The potential for landslides  threatened the safety of 35,000
people living in shanties  on the slopes, as well as the highways  and the railroads connecting  Cubatao  to
Sao Paulo and the rest of Brazil. 8"
In  1980 the head of SEMA (the federal Special Secretariat of the Environment),  suggested
relocating  the people of Vila Parisi.  The Vila Parisi residents  objected. They preferred that the state
control  pollution  sources sufficiently  for them to continue  to live close to work. The turning point came
in 1984. In February, a Petrobras  pipeline  under Vila Soco (another  of Cubatao's slums)  burst, leaking
700,000 liters of gas and causing a  fire that destroyed 1000 homes and killed 100 residents.  In
September, an atmospheric  inversion  caused such pollution that the governor  of Sao Paulo ordered the
evacuation  of Vila Parisi and the shutdown  of nine industries. Finally, in January of 1985  a fertilizer
plant in Vila  Parisi leaked  ammonia,  again  forcing  evacuation. By then, Vila Parisi residents  had changed
their minds-they wanted to be relocated.
As Table 16 shows, emissions in Cubatao seem to have peaked in the mid-1980's:
Table  16
Emissions of Air Pollutants in Cubatao`2
(tons ,er day)
Pollutant  1980  4M  19898
TSP  148  236.6  25.5
SO 2 182  78.4  17.8
NO.  41  61.1t  18.8
HC  31  90.0  7.2
Nitrogen dioxide, NO 2 .
Sources of air pollution
World  Bank studies  of pollution  in Cubatao  concur  that industry  is almost  completely  responsible
for the air quality problem there.  In fact, no studies even bother cataloguing  mobile or area sources.
As a result, policy instruments  aimed only at stationary  point sources need  to be considered.
Sao Paulo's state environmental  regulator, CETESB,  has identified 18 priority sources of air
pollution.  These include petrochemical  plants, fertilizer factories, and processors of non-metallic
minerals, paper and pulp, and cement."  Of these, 4 were public enterprises, 6 were multinational
corporations,  and 8 were privately  owned  domestic companies. The bv'*c  of the pollutants  were emitted
by the state enterprises,  including  over 95 percent of the NO 2 and HC, over 75 percent of the SO 2, and
8 "Findley (1988).
u1980 data are from Findley (1988), p. 53; 1984  data are from CETESB  (1986), p. 40; and 1988
data are from CETESB  (1989), p. 16.
ICETESB (1987), p. 16.
38about  50 percent of the TSP. Private  Brazilian  companies  emitted  less than 1 percent  of the NO 2 and HC,
less than 10 percent of the S02,  and less than 50 percent of the TSP (Table 17).
Policy optionj&
Two interesting  questions arise in the context of this study.  First, given the life-threatening
emergency  that existed in 1984, what were the efficient  policies to adopt? Second, have these policies
changed given  the improved  air quality in Cubatao  today?
Use of economic incentives: market versus non-market policies
Public sector enterprises present the main obstacle to using incentive-based  regulations  for air
pollution control throughout  Brazil and particularly in Cubatao. There is very little private domestic
ownership of heavy and pollution-intensive  industries  such as steel, automobiles,  oil, and chemicals,
which are dominated  by multinationals  and state-owned  enterprises." In Cubatao, state enterprises  are
particularly important. Out of 230 sources of air pollution in Cubatao, 95 were located in two firms
owned by the federal government: PETROBRAS, the petroleum company; and COSIPA, the steel
company."
As noted  before, state-owned  sources  will not respond  to incentive-based  instruments  to the extent
that cost minimization  does not guide their decision making.  The other main category of sources-
multinationals  likely do minimize  costs, and may therefore be amenable  to the use of incentive-based
policies.
Level of control: direct versus indirect policies
CETESB  appears  quite capable  of monitoring  direct policies  applied  to large stationary  sources.
In 1986, it had over 2000 employees, including 650 professionals, and a budget of $33 million-90
percent from  Sao Paulo state and  10 percent from  consulting revenues.' 6 It  maintains modem
laboratories  staffed by 140 technicians  and 120 professionals, which give it the ability to examine all
types of samples  and determine  the pollutants  present  and likely  sources. In addition, CETESB  maintains
a continuous  air quality monitoring  system, including  three monitors in Cubatao. In order to maintain
its capabilities, its staff are trained continuously  in new technologies  and procedures,  and worn-out or
obsolete  monitoring  and laboratory  equipment  is replaced. In this respect it is unique in Latin America
and among  developing  countries.
Because  only 18 large industrial  plants comprising  230 individual  sources were responsible  for
virtually all emissions in Cubatao,v  the number of sources poses no great barrier to using direct
regulations.  Rather, the costs of using direct instruments  would stem mainly from the difficulty of
monitoring  emissions. However, CETESB's  competence  as a regulator  and the relatively small number
of stationary  point sources makes its air pollution  problem well suited  to direct regulation.
"'Findley  (1988), p. 29.
8 5CETESB  (1987).
"6One problem with CETESB  might be a conflict  between  its consulting  role and its regulatory  role.
(Findley [19881).
'7CETESB  "Acao da CETESB  em Cubatao," 1989.
39Control variable: price or quantity versus technology
The state of emergency  that existed  in 1984  suggests  that at the time, quantity  restrictions  would
have  dominated  price instruments. Concentrations  of several  air pollutants  were high enough  to be quite
toxic, especially  in Vila Parisi. The choice then, is limited  to direct non-incentive  quantity  or technology
instruments. Among  these, quantity  instruments  would  be inefficient  because  they do not equate  marginal
abatement  costs across sources.  However, technology instruments  are inefficient  because they do not
necessarily  minimize  abatement  costs across various methods  of controlling  emissions  even for a single
source.  Given that in 1984 industries  in Cubatao were doing virtually  no abatement, and that CETESB
had been researching abatement technologies  for years, CETESB  may have had more technological
expertise  than individual  firms. This suggests  the tentative conclusion  that technology  instruments  might
dominate  quantity instruments.
Would  instrument  choice differ today,  when the most egregious  sources  have been  eradicated  and
Cubatao appears  to be habitable? The number of sources is still small, CETESB  still capable, and the
public sector firms are still important  sources of emissions. So nothing  has changed  to make  direct non-
incentive  approaches  less cost-effective  than they were five  years ago. Perhaps, however,  with abatement
technology  in place and the emergency  situation  contained,  it might now be more efficient  to control  the
quantity  of emissions  rather than mandate  control  technologies.
What has Brazil done?
As in other countries, in Brazil there has been a reversal of attitudes  towards the environment.
At the 1972 United Nations Environmental  Conference in Stockholm,  the Brazilian Minister of the
Interior  said "a country  that has not yet achieved  a minimal  standard  of living  is not in a position  to spend
its valuable resources protecting the environment.""  Yet today Brazil's environmental regulatory
framework  looks much like that of the United States. The federal government  sets air and water quality
standards  similar to those in the U.S., which the states are free to strengthen. The states set emissions
limitations  and equipment  requirements  that apply to individual  sources. The two levels of goverment
then share responsibility  for enforcement."
Because  detailed  pollution  control  legislation  did not exist before 1976, CETESB  devoted  its first
several  years to developing  abatement  technology,  training personnel,  and monitoring  ambient  pollution.
Since  then, its role has expanded  greatly. Today, the state has the power to (1) subsidize  investment  in
pollution abatement or relocation to less sensitive areas, (2) fine excess pollution, (3) suspend the
operations  of non-complying  facilities, (4) remove subsidies  or tax incentives  granted by Sao Paulo or
the federal govermnent, and (5) withdraw government  financing  from facilities.90 The legal authority
seems to be in place to enforce any type of regulation.
Until recently, CETESB  focused primarily  on TSP and SO, from industrial sources.  In 1980
CETESB  convinced  Petrobras and ESSO to agree to deliver only low sulfur fuel to Sao Paulo state from
May to September  (the winter months when absorptive  capacity  is lowest). This may explain the drop
in S02 emissions  in Cubatao from 1980  to 1984  (Table 16). Two years later, CETESB  stopped  issuing
'Worcman (1990), p. 45.
"'Findley (1988).
90Findley  (1988).
40construction licenses for new oil-burning sources in Sao Paulo.91 Starting in  1985, state and local
officials  began  taking actions to clean up Cubatao. Daily fines were imposed  on several  companies  until
toxic waste sites were made safe.  Much of the regulatory  focus was on steel mills, which now have
higher stacks and contribute  less pollution  to the Vila Parisi area.92 Parts of Vila Parisi were razed, and
its occupants  given public housing elsewhere  in Cubatao. With the help of loans from the World Bank
about  60 companies  in Sao Paulo state, mostly  in Cubatao,  invested  over $100 million  in pollution  control
projects costing on average $1.9 million each.  Many of the projects converted oil-fired boilers to
electricity in order to reduce SO 2 emissions.
As seemed  optimal, CETESB  used mostly  direct non-incentive  technology  approaches  in Cubatao.
State enterprises, which were responsible  for most of the emissions Initially, cleaned up the most.
However, they are still the largest of Cubatao's polluters (Table 17).  The results of these policies, by
the end of the decade, have been surprisingly  good. In 1989,  CETESB  reported  that of the 320 (air and
water) pollution  sources among the 25 major industries  in Cubatao, 249 (76%) were under control, 34
sources were on schedule for control, and the remaining  37 sources were behind schedule. In March
1987,  Rio's leading newspaper  described  Cubatao  as "cured,"  citing the evidence  presented in Table 18.
Ambient  air quality  has undoubtedly  improved-at least in terms  of reducing  instances  of dangerously  high
pollution (Table 19).
Table  17
State Enterpiss  Cleaned up Most in Cubatao"
Stat-owned  (4)  Muldnationab (6)  Domestic private (8)  Total
tpd  %  tpd  %  tpd  %  tpd
1984
NO 2 58.8  97.4  1.0  1.7  .5  .9  60.1
TSP  157.7  47.8  27.3  8.6  138.5  43.6  317.5
SO 2 61.0  78.6  10.7  13.7  5.9  7.6  77.6
HC  62.4  96.4  2.0  3.2  .3  .4  64.7
Recently
NO 2 44.9  96.7  1.0  2.1  .5  1.2  46.4
TSP  68.0  80.0  3.5  4.2  13.5  15.9  85.0
so2  32.3  66.9  10.1  20.9  5.9  12.2  48.3
HC  9.8  95.3  .2  2.2  .3  2.5  10.3
% channe
NO 2 -23.3 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  -22.7 %
TSP  -55.2 %  -87.1 %  -90.2 %  -73.2 %
SO2  47.0  %  -S.l  %  0.0 %  -37.7 %
HC  -84.3 %  -88.9 %  0.0  %  -84.1 %
9 "Findley (1988).
'2CETESB  (1986), p.  11.
"Facsimile from CETESB.
41Table 18
Air Pollutant  Emissions  in Cubatao  woe Quickly  Controlled' 4
(tons  yoe davy
Polutant  I283  1987
TSP  236  33
NO,  78  11
fluoride  90  12
Table 19
Episodes  of Poor Air Quality  Li  C;ubatao  Decreased 9'
Level  of Pollution  1984  1985  l9J6  1987  188
'Alert"  16  14  6  4  3
"Emergency"  I  I  0  0  0
TOTAL  17  15  6  4  3
Recent events cast some doubt on the extent of Cubatao's recovery.  In July 1991, ambient
particulate concentrations in Vila Parisi reached 2000 pAg/m 2 due to  a thermal inversion.  CETESB
responded  by closing  8 of the local industries,  mostly  producers  of fertilizer. By the end of the day the
particulate  concentration  had fallen to 150  pg/r 2. So now CETESB  faces two problems in Cubatao. It
has to ensure that air quality does not worsen as Brazil's economy  grows and demands  more industrial
inputs. CETESB  must also examine  the extent to which air pollution  has been cleaned  up by transferring
pollution  to other environmental  media. Although  Cubatao's  factories  no longer  emit as much  waste into
the air, these could  be ending  up either in surface water or in landfills  and have the potential  to worsen
water pollution or create hazardous  waste problems  in the future.
ANKARA
Like all the cities studied  here, Ankara lies in a setting that is not conducive  to dispersing  large
amounts  of air pollutants. Mountains  rise 400 meters above the city on three sides, and Ankara itself is
at moderately  high altitude (900 meters). Light wind speeds and frequent atmospheric  inversions  keep
pollutants in high concentrations  for long periods."  In addition, Ankara has become famous for its
London-type  fogs, which are exacerbated  by particulates  from burning poor quality fuels.'
Before the 1960s, when Ankara's population  did not exceed 600,000, air pollution was not a
problem. But today, with its population  having  risen above  2 million, and expected  to grow by 2.5-3.0
percent annually for many years, Ankara's air quality is cause for concern.'  Moreover, Turkey's
'Findley (1988), p. 63.
"CETESB. "Acao da CETESB  em Cubatao" mimeograph  1989, p. 9.
"Altaban and Guvenc (1990), p. 152.
97EPFT (1989), p. 44.
"Altaban and Guvenc (1990), pp. 152, 157.
42application  to join the European Community  (EC) has brought its air pollution regulations  under greater
scrutiny and led to calls for remedial action .9
Of the cities studied  here, Ankara  has the poorest  available  ambient  air quality information. Only
SO 2 and TSP are monitored adequately. Ambient  levels of ozone, HC, CO, Pb, and NO, are unknown.
While this poses obvious problems  for the analysis  here, it is not an unusual situation  for a developing
country. Environmental  regulators  often must deal with as little or even less data than are available  for
Ankara.
Table  20
Relative  Air Quality  in Ankaram°
Pollutant  WHO  EPA  Turkish  std  3-month  avg  Max  24-hr
std  std  1984/5  concentration
S02 (Ag/r')  125  365  400  350-900  1000.2000
24 hour
PMIo  (Ag/Mr)  70  IS0  300-400
24 hour
TSP (ug/mr)  125  260  159-227  500+
24 hour
Sources of air pollution
Emissions  data for Ankara are barely better than the air quality  data.  From what little is known
about the relative contributions  from various broad categories  of sources, stationary non-point  sources
appear to emit most of the pollution.
Table  21
Estimated  Emissions  In Ankam  frm  Combustion'°'  (1990)
Pollutant  Transport  Home Heating
(tons/yr)  (tons/yr)
TSP  1160  20,100
S02  870-3151'  56,500-58,510
NO.  252,290  3650
HC  54,000  5700
CO  311,650  27,700
* Emissions  during  the winter  of 19S84-5.
There is very little industry in Ankara. Large point sources  of pollution  are limited  to a cement  factory,
a few asphalt preparation plants, a sugar plant, a gunpowder factory, two gas plants, and a tractor
9Plinke, et. al. (1990), p. 75.
IceSebastian  (1990), "Ankara diagnostic,"  pp. 15, 20; notes of Wendy  Ayres.
"tSebastian  (1990), "Ankara diagnostic,"  p. 8.
43factory. Industry  employs  only 12.5% of Ankara's labor force, compared  to 75% for social service and
commercial,  and 4.5% for agriculture."' 2
Ankara also has relatively few motor vehicles.  The density of the city, forced in part by the
mountains surrounding it, limits the possible commuting  time to below the average for cities of its
type."'0 In 1983 Ankara had onlyj  185,000  motor vehicles, but the number  has been growing by 1)0%
a year.""  At this rate, Ankara would have over a million  vehicles by 2000, and a potentially  serious
transportation-related  air pollution  problem.
Currently  however, Ankara's air quality  problems  appear  to stem not from industry  or transport,
but from its energy  sector. Since  the initiation  of Turkey's New  Economic  Plan in 1980, rapid economic
growth, urbanization,  and a structural  shift towards  industry  away  from agriculture,  have stimulated  large
increases  in energy demand. In recent years, Turkey's energy demand has grown faster than its GDP,
causing  the Turkish economy  to become  increasingly  energy-intensive.  One common  measure  of energy
intensity-total  primary energy  requirements  per unit of GDP-was 0.60 for Turkey compared  with 0.32
for Western Europe."'5
Ankara's energy sector is also relatively  dirty.  Domestic  lignite, high in ash and sulfur and low
in energy, is burned to produce electricity. Turkey's SO 2 emissions  exemplify its pollution intensity.
Per capita, Turkey emits less SO 2 than any EC country  except Portugal. However,  Turkey emits more
SO?  for each unit of primary energy consumed  than twice the EC average, and more SO 2 per dollar of
GDP than any other EC country."'0
Only lately  has there been a shift towards  hydroelectric  power and, starting in 1987, natural gas
imports  from the USSR."'  This change should be a very important  step towards decreasing  pollution
from the Turkish energy sector.  Because  Turkish energy is so pollution-intensive,  pollution will rise
faster with economic  growth than it has in other countries.
"'2Sebastian  (1990), "Ankara diagnostic,"  p. 11; JICA (1986), p. 14.
10Altaban and Guvenc (1990), p. 153.
""JICA (1986), p. 123.
'05Plinke,  et. al. (1990), pp. 1, 76.
'O'Plinke,  et. al. (1991), p. 7-9.
'O7Sebastian  (1990), "Ankara diagnostic,"  p. 5.
44Table 22
Turkey's  Energy  Sector  is Pollution-Intcnsive'os
Emissions  |  Turkey  (1978)  F.R. Germany  (1980)
Per  capita (kg)
So,  16  52
NO,  8  so
TSP  3  12
Per unit pn8auy  energy (kg/TOE)
SO,  26.9  16.0
NO,,  14.3  15.4
TSP  5.2  3.6
Table  23
Lignite is Pollution Intensive and Energy Inefficient'"
Turkdsh Lignite  Impoted  Coal
Sulfur Content (%)  1-6 %  0.8-1.0  %
Volatiles (%)  17-20  %  20-24 %
Ash (%)  1041  %  4.546.5 %
Heat Content (Kcal/kg)  1000-5750  6000
Moisture (%)  3-50 %  8 %
Cost (Turkish  lirm/ton)  14,000  120,000  L
Forty-three percent of Turkey's  energy requirements are met by  imported oil (Table 24).
Domestic lignite's share has risen to 20% from 10% in the 1970s, and imported hard coal produces
another 9%.  Hydroelectricity,  natural gas from the USSR, and various non-commercial  sources  such as
fuel wood and agricultural  wastes provide  the balance."1 0
Lignite, which constitutes  90% of all Turkish domestic  coal production  by weight (80% on an
energy equivalence  basis), has been promoted as a substitute for imported oil."1'  In 1983 industrial
lignite  prices were 91% of prices  for equivalent  imported  coal. But thanks  to price distortions,  the power
sector, which consumes  85% of the domestically  produced  lignite, paid  only 68% of the cost of imported
coal.  In addition, a $10/ton tariff was applied  to imports  of hard coal in 1986.112
Within the energy  sector, much of Ankara's air pollution  is produced  by space  heating. Because
lignite is burned by individual  homes and businesses  in the winter, this is when air quality levels are at
'°Plinke, et. al. (1990), p. 77.
09Sebastian  (1990), "Ankara  diagnostic," p. 23.
"°Plinke, et. al. (1991), pp. 4-5.
t' t Plinke, et. al. (1991), p. 1.
"2Kosmo  (1989), pp. 30-32.
45their worst.  '3 During the winter of 1984/5, it is estinrted  that 90% of SO 2 emissions were from
domestic and commercial  coal and lignite burning for heat, 75% from lignite alone."1 4 Though more
lignite  is burned in power plants  than in homes, home heating is less efficient  and more polluting.
There are many methods  of reducing  pollution from space heating.  Some require substantial
public infrastructure  investments,  and are thus only applicable  to the long-run (LR).  A few examples
include
*  pre-treating  h  -..e before distribution,
*  improving  boile-/stove  technology,
*  substituting  imported  coal for natural gas (LR),
*  providing  district heating, possibly  through cogeneration  of steam from
power plants (LR),
*  insulating  homes and businesses  to reduce demand (LR).
In addition, developed countries have accumulated  considerable knowledge about pollution
abatement  technologies  for coal-fired  electric  power plants. Unfortunately  none of it is directly  applicable
to Turkey's  brand of  lignite." 5 Turkey's Environmental  Agency cannot simply apply an existing
control  or process technology  already being used elsewhere.
Analysts have assumed that Ankara's only air pollution  problem stems from the combustion  of
lignite. This conclusion  also deserves some caution  due to the lack of available  information. While we
know that the transport  sector is responsible  for most of the NO,, HC, and CO emitted, we do not know
whether these pollutants exceed safe levels.  If policy makers focus only on SOQ  and TSP, the two
pollutants  that are known to be out of compliance,  they may be making a serious omission. But for a
developing country such as Turkey, an error of commission  such as regulating a pollutant  for which
emissions are within acceptable  limits, may be equally costly.  One necessary step, therefore, is to
improve ambient  monitoring  for pollutants  such as CO and HC.  Another step is to recognize  that even
though pollution from transport is not problematic now, Ankara will likely face this problem in the
future.  Policy makers would be wise to begin dealing with it now, before more infrastructure  is built
for private gasoline-  or diesel-powered  vehicles.
Policv olptions
The ignorance  about Ankara's current air quality  makes policy choice even more difficult. Yet
distinctions  can still  be drawn between  general  policy options  that are available. Space  heating,  presumed
to be the largest source of pollution,  differs the most from the emissions  sources  that have been examined
in the other city case studies. The power sector is state-run, and thus is most amenable  to administrative
flat.  Future transport sector pollution can be avoided through current investment  in public transport
infrastructure,  and by adopting the technologies  already in use in developed  countries.
'3Plinke, et. al. (1990), p. 76.
"'Sebastian (1990), "Ankara diagnostic,"  p. 22.
"'Sebastian (1990), "Ankara  diagnostic,"  p. 20.
46The policy goals can be considered  in stages. The first should  be to remove  the price distortions
that favor the use of domestic  lignite. The second  stage  should induce  substitution  away from high sulfur
fuels for households, industry, and the power sector.  A 1987 policy substituted lower sulfur South
African and Chinese coal for domeiif  lignite, but did little to improve  air quality.  Illegal  high sulfur
coal reached Ankara in sufficient quantities to maintain ambient SO, levels." 6 Even if It had not,
population  growth  would likely soon overtake any gains from switching  fuel types. In the long run, the
policy goal should be to connect more areas of the city to a collective home heating infrastructure,
especially  natural gas and district heating.
Use of economic incentives: market versus non-market policies
For the household sector incentive-based  policies may work well.  A fuel tax based on sulfur
content seems reasonable. Such a tax would also have an effect on Ankara's few industries,  which are
mainly large private sector companies." 7 The main problem with incentive-based  policies would be
its potentially  regressive  distributional  effects. Unlike  a gasoline  tax in Mexico  City, which would affect
mainly the wealthiest  in the population  who account for most driving of automobiles, _ kara's poorest
citizens may suffer most from a fuel tax.  This objection could be surmounted  by refunding the tax
equally to all citizens  or by using the revenues  to finance  progressive  expenditures.
Level of control: direct versus indirect policies
Turkey's lack of regulatory ability, combined  with the number  of individual  sources involved  in
home heating, suggest that direct policy instruments  are probably  infeasible. Turkey's monitoring  and
enforcement  capacity  will  hopefully  improve,  but for the present, Ankara's pollution  regulations  will  have
to be indirect.
Control variable: price or quantity versus technology
The choice between price and quantity instruments  is made difficult  by the missing air quality
information. Because regulators do not know how much pollution  needs to be controlled, they do not
know how stringent the regulations need to be, nor can they guess the benefits from improving  the air
quality. In other words, regulators  have no information  about  the shapes of either the abatement  cost or
the environmental  benefit functions.
Technology instruments  are limited  by the lack of knowledge  about how to deal with Turkish
lignite.  Because  existing technologies  are unsuitable, new research  will nesd to discover  ways to burn
lignite more cleanly.  Eventually,  this may be the best solution  to Ankara's air pollution problem, and
regulators must ensure that they do not sacrifice  this goal for short-run  gains.
What has Turkey done?
Turkey established  an Undersecretariat  of the Environment  in 1978, passed the Enviromnental
Protection  Law in 1983, and the Regulation  on the Protection  of Air Quality,  which set ambient  standards
'16EPFT  (1989), p. 44; Sebastian  (1990), "Ankara diagnostic,"  p. 23.
' 7Kosmo (1989), p. 36.
47for large sources of common  pollutants, in 19S6. Until now these laws have had little effect, as they
have been dominated  by policies aimed at rapid industrialization. As a result of its attempt to join the
EC, Turkey  has reformed  its attitude  towards  environmental  issues. However,  only ambient  SO 2 and TSP
are monitored, and none of the standards is enforced." 8 With insufficient  monitoring  and non-existent
enforcement,  Turkish air quality standards cannot  be taken seriously.
In 1986 a large scale program began converting  small vehicles to diesel fuel.' 19 This was a
curious policy choice given the potentially  disastrous  consequences  it could have for ambient  S02  and
particulate  levels, which are already serious problems. While it would improve ambient  ozone levels,
this is not currently thought to be a problem. This policy was followed in 1989  by the introduction  of
a fledgling motor vehicle inspection  program. While this step is important,  its effectiveness  should be
examined  and changes  made in light of the experiences  of other countries  with such programs. As point
sources are brought under control or leave Ankara, and as Ankara's population  increases and becomes
more prosperous,  the relative contribution  of vehicles  to emissions  will grow quickly. It seems wise to
put regulatory  institutions  and control policies in place now, before  the problem  grows worse.
A high pressure natural gas network was financed by a World Bank loan.  The loan also
converted the old gas distribution network, which served about 100,000  users, from manufactured  to
natural gas.  Future plans include  extending  natural gas service to an additional  200,000 customers. To
the extent this system replaces the use of lignite for home heating, it will improve  air quality.
So far, all of the steps Turkey has taken rely on public investments  or actions by state-owned
energy  companies. If Ankara is to improve  its air quality, policies  must also begin to affect  the behavior
of individuals  and firms. Further, as is beginning  to happen  in Mexico  City, the  belief that environmental
goals stand in the way of development  needs to be changed, while the institutional  framework for
designing  and implementing  environmental  policies needs to be strengthened.
PART IV: CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
Conclusion
Economists  examining  the choice  of environmental  policies  have  emphasized  the use of economic
incentives,  usually with reference to direct price or quantity instruments,  and have ruled in favor of
incentive-based  policies.  Many of these policy discussions, however, have confused the issue by
comparing  direct incentive-based  policies to indirect  non-incentive  policies. Positive  attributes  of direct
policies  are then  mistakenly  used to demonstrate  the superiority  of incentive-based  policies. Alternatively,
incentive-based  price instruments  are compared  to non-incentive  quantity  instruments,  and the advantages
of price (over quantity)  instruments  are cited to support the use of economic  incentives. This paper has
tried to separate these three issues (use of incentives,  level of control, and control variable)  in order to
make general observations  about  policy choice.
l'8Sebastian  (1990), "Ankara  diagnostic," p. 19.
"'Sebastian (1990), "Ankara  diagnostic," p. 16.
48Despite the theoretical advantages of incentive-based  direct policies, regulatory agencies in
developed  countries  have relied almost exclusively  on non-incentive  direct policies. When  environmental
regulations  were first enacted, incentive-based  policies were less popular  than they have since become,
especially  within  the environ,ental movement. As a result, non-incentive  policies remain on the books,
in part due to the expense  and political cost of changing  policy regimes. Another reason non-incentive
policies  are more pervasive  may be the transfer effect  of such instruments. Incentive  policies  have been
called (quite misleadingly)  "polluter pays twice" policies by industry  groups, who fear paying  both the
abatement costs and the taxes or permit prices.  Apart from limited schemes in France, Japan and
Southern  California,  emissions  charges  have not been used for air pollution  even in OECD countries.'"
Developing countries seem to have followed suit, but have failed to enforce many of their
policies.  The monitoring and enforcement costs associated with direct policies may be too high in
developing countries.  By not enforcing these, many of these countries might as well have had no
environmental  regulations  at all.  Recently,  as a result of lethal environmental  problems,  at least two of
the cities examined  here have  become  serious  about  improving  environmental  quality. Their new attitudes
towards environmental  protection  merit a fresh consideration  of the policy choices  available to them.
After analyzing  efficient  responses  to the air pollution  problem in four very different cities, the
results that emerge are somewhat  surprising  (rable 25).  For three of the cities, the efficient instruments
selected  by this (admittedly  limited)  exercise  are similar: indirect  incentive-based  policies. Only Cubatao
differs in that the efficient policy choice is probably  direct non-incentive  regulations.
Table  25
For Most  Cities, tho Efficient  Policies  are  Similar
Los  Ar  teles  Mexico  City  Cubawa  Anksm
poUutant  0,,  PM 1O,  CO  0,, TSP, CO  TSP, SO., NO 2, HC  TED SO., ?
source  non-point  non-point  point  non-point
regulator  strong  weak  staong  weak
public  poUuters  no  somn  most  few
toxicity  low  high  high  ?
optimal  policy
* incentive  use  0 incentive/non-  * incentive/non-  * non-incentihc  * incentive
* control  level  0  indirect  0 indirect  0 direct  * indirect
* control variable  e  - * quantity/technology  * quantity/technology  * 
Though the conclusions  shown in Table 25 favor indirect  policies, several caveats  must be noted.
When indirect  policies are preferred, combinations  of such policies may be efficient. Indirect policies
cannot simultaneously  target the incentives  to reduce waste generation, increase  production efficiency,
and reduce output in order to reduce pollution. A combination  of indirect policies may have a better
chance  of reducing  emissions. However,  the regulatory  costs  of controlling  additional  variables  have  only
'20Opschoor  and Vos (1989).
49been noted in passing here.  If these costs are high they may outweigh  the cost of monitoring  a single
direct instrument.
Second, indirect  regulations  can be accompanied  by perverse incentives,  such as new source bias
or lowered  marginal  costs of polluting. Efforts  to offset these  perverse  incentives  by regulating  additional
control variables may be subject to second-best  problems: two regulations  with opposite  results can be
worse than no regulation  at all.
Third, this paper has not characterized  fully the efficiency  losses that arise from using indirect
instruments  and may, therefore, have biased  policy choice  in favor of indirect  instruments. These  losses
depend  on a complicated  set of relationships,  and their precise  estimation  in the context  of environmental
probleni has not been attempted  here.
Last, indirect  in; .ruments  comprise  the broadest  policy category.  Some of the cells in Table 2
contain a limited number of conceivable  policies. The direct incentive-based  price instrument  cell, for
example, contains only one instrument--emissions  taxes. The indirect incentive-based  price instrument
cell,  however, contains a  large number of  policies-taxes or, inputs, outputs, complements, and
substitutes. For this reason, by favoring  indirect  policies, part of the work in choosing  efficient  policies
has been avoided. The remaining  task-choosing  the combination  of indirect  policies  that minimizes  this
ill-defined  efficiency  loss-remains but would require substantially  more detailed information  than has
been available  in these case studies.
Several general lessons can also be learned from the cases examined.  One involves the
constraints imposed by previous policy decisions.  Once decisions  are made-whether to concentrate
industry, to rely on private vehicles  for transportation,  to subsidize  a particular  energy source, or to use
a certain environmental  policy-they acquire a certain  permanence. Capital is invested  and workers are
trained under the prevailing laws, and these are costly to change.  Los Angeles cannot reverse its
emphasis  on the automobile;  Brazil cannot  easily move its industrial  center away from Cubatao;  Mexico
cannot quickly reduce the concentration  in its capital city;  and Turkey's development  would suffer if
domestic  energy subsidies  were removed  abruptly. For this reason it is important  to design policy with
an eye towards longer-run  concerns. It makes sense, for example,  for cities such as Ankara to begin to
enact policies to prevent mobile source air pollution  from worsening  over the next decades.
A related lesson involves  the cost of waiting  too long before addressing environmental  issues.
The three developing  countries in this paper all placed  economic  growth above  the environment  on their
policy agendas  until too late.  Now that the environment  has become  a critical issue, policy makers  have
been forced  to use quantity-based  instruments  to reduce  pollution,  regardless  of the cost involved. Delays
in undertaking  policies for environmental  protection  may increase the eventual cost of acting because
many options are foreclosed.
A  particularly  important  caveat  to the discussion  here is that the dangers  of intermedia  substitution
of pollutants are often ignored. In places such as Cubatao, where air quality has been cleaned  up, the
improvement  may have come at the expense  of water quality, the accumulation  of hazardous  wastes, or
the excessive  use of natural resources. This raises the further issue  of whether  the principles for policy
choice illustrated  in this paper apply also to environmental  problems  other than air pollution, including
possibilities  for inter-media  substitution. Some thoughts  on this issue follow.
50Applications to other Environmental Problems
Water pollution provides the closest parallel to urban air pollution.  Effluents  (into water) and
emissions  (into air) from factories and households  are both the result of similar processes. Airsheds  are
similar in size and nature to water basins.  The main difference is that with pollution of rivers and
streams the externality goes in only one direction: upstream polluters impose costs upon downstream
victims  without  bearing any return costs. All of the policy instruments  considered  for urban air pollution
have analogues  for water pollution  control. Water pollution  is easier  to monitor  and therefore  more likely
subject to direct controls.  But because it has more pronounced  ambient  effects (there are no global or
uniformly dispersed water pollutants), the  cost-effectiveness  advantage of  direct policies is  more
ambiguous  since even policies that target emissions  are effectively  indirect.
Hazardous materials,  because  they are easily transported,  pose a special  set of problems. There
is a tension  between  the two policy goals  of reducing  the output  of waste  and ensuring  its proper disposal.
In the U.S., for instance, the manifest system required by RCRA tracks all off-site  shipments  of toxic
waste, addressing  only the latter goal.  Any attempt  to address waste generation  directly by taxing or
limiting  toxic output  would  jeopardize  the goals of RCRA  because  of its undesirable  effects  on compliance
with the manifest system.  Because  hazardous wastes are easy to dump covertly, a direct policy may
reduce the level of compliance and unintentionally  increase the amount  of improper disposal.  Only a
carefully  designed  deposit-refund  scheme  or indirect  policies, such as feedstock  taxes, could avoid this
problem.
Natural resources, as the physical input to the production  process, might appear to be the least
likely to fit within  the framework  used above. Yet emissions  have an analog  in resource  use. Both proxy
for the cost to society, which is the truly direct control variable. Policies  to reduce resource use to an
optimal level can be direct or indirect; incentive  or non-incentive;  and price, quantity or technology-
based. Table 26 below adapts  Table 2 to illustrate  policy alternatives  for natural resource  management.
Table 26
Altemative Policies to Reduce Natural Resourec Extraction
Price  Quandty  Technology
Incentive  Direct  resource extraction fee  tradable  extraction  permits  tax on extraction technology (drift
(stumpage fee)  (grazing permits)  nets)
Indirect  resource access tax  tradable access rights  tax on related technology (boat)
Non-  Direct  . extraction quotas  limits on extraction technology
incentive  . _  _._  ._  ._  ._  (strip mining)
Indimect  - access quotas  limits on relat  technology (boat
______  ______  ________________  ~~~~~~~permits)
For water pollution and hazardous  wastes there are likely to be both public and private sector
polluters. So the decision  to use incentive-based  policies  should  depend  on the same  set of considerations
that was used in the case of urban air pollution. Natural resources are also likely to have large public
sector  enterprises involved  in their extraction,  as well as small informal  sector 'poachers." The former
will respond best to direct non-incentive  instruments,  the latter to indirect incentive-based  instruments.
51By studying  air pollution alone  we have avoided  the difficult  question  of intermedia  substitution.
Air pollution  is also probably  the least toxic and least long-lasting  of the three pollution  media. However,
it is also the most politically  charged.  Air pollution is visible to everyone,  affects everyone, and is in
part caused by everyone. Individual  consumers  and businesses  must bear most of the nominal costs of
reducing air pollution.  Water pollution, hazardous  wastes, and natural resources are more often the
bailiwick  of governments,  which will bear the cleanup costs. In the end, governments  must face all the
environmental problems together,  for  they are  inextricably related.  Accounting for  intermedia
substitution,  however, requires  that pollutants  be compared  across  environmental  problems,  which in turn
requires  that the beneflts  of abatement  be measured. This paper has focused  on cost-effectiveness  rather
than efficiency  precisely because  those benefits are difficult  to quantify  accurately.
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